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Abstract
Examination of new data of the Mexican government securities primary auctions
shows, not only that there exists underpricing with respect to the secondary market
in CETES, the zero coupon Treasury bonds, of 28, 91, 182, and 365 days maturity,
but also that such underpricing tends to increase over time, especially during the
period of 1996-2000.  This study also finds that changes to the auction format
employed by the Mexican Treasury do not fully account for this pattern because in
spite that since 1995 the discriminatory format is in place, some modifications have
been adopted with the purpose of improving sales conditions in the primary
auctions, like setting common maximum bidding limits for all participants or
reopening securities issues with high observed interest rates.  Usual factors
assumed to affect auction prices by existing models, like competition level, bidder
participation and market uncertainty seem to play a role.  However, evidence is
also found that some factors related to secondary market features suggested by
the finance microstructure literature, like liquidity, inventory and adverse selection
costs may be playing an even more important role.  Overall, these findings provide
confirmation of the relevance of resale markets and suggests that:  1)  it may be
fruitful to add some of these latter features in future theoretical models about
government securities markets and 2)  to improve secondary market conditions
may be important to enhance efficiency in the primary market.
Keywords: primary auctions, secondary markets, treasury securities
JEL:  D440
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1.  Introduction
Underpricing of the auction security relative to the secondary market, in effect, the
resale in the secondary market of the security awarded in the primary auction to its
winners at a higher price (or a lower interest rate), is a common finding which has
arisen from the growing body of empirical evidence on government debt auctions.
Nonetheless, because both theory and experience suggest that the persistence of
such phenomenon may be due at least to some extent to the market’s vulnerability
to manipulation, it is constantly monitored and combated against by financial
authorities throughout the world.  Their concern is that market manipulability may
undermine the price-discovery process and, ultimately, destroy public confidence in
the efficiency and integrity of the market.  As a result, cases of “market squeezes”
–gaining control of an issue at the time of auction and subsequently restricting its
supply on the cash and repo markets– arise concerns about rules and practices in
the primary and secondary markets.  Such concerns have translated into
significant innovation in government market securities, which tend to benefit the
taxpayer by increasing liquidity and thereby lowering government’s financing costs.
Multiple academic articles and central bank reports suggest that this is what
happens in the government securities markets of developed countries like the
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Italy or Spain, at
least.  The fact that Mexico’s primary auction basic rules regarding the set of
possible competitors, maximum bidding limits and auction format have not been
changed substantially since 1995 suggests, however, that this may be true to a
quite lesser extent in an emerging country perhaps due to weaker institutions or to
legal or informational voids.
Thanks to the availability of a data set of government debt primary auction results,
a new and more extensive examination of the price differentials of the Mexican
Treasury zero coupon bonds denominated CETES
1 is carried out attempting to link
the observed patterns with auction theory predictions.  As is often the case in
several areas of economics empirical research, quite less is known about
government securities markets of emerging countries, in spite of the shared
concerns of financial authorities and that the sales mechanisms employed are very
similar at first glance.  Hence another contribution of this study is to review some
financial market regulatory changes that have affected the size, number and
composition of firms and the complexity of Mexican financial sector, with special
emphasis on auction format changes.
An important finding is that underpricing is not only a common but an increasing
feature in the CETES of 28, 91, 182 and 365 days maturity.  This pattern seems
more pronounced after 1996 and despite that the Mexican Treasury later put in
place a common maximum bidding limit for all auction participants and the
reopening of securities for which high market interests rates are observed, two
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measures that hypothetically improve sales conditions of the primary auction.
Price differentials are compared across titles and across the different sales rules
employed.  Evidence is found that besides price differentials are smaller in uniform
format auctions than in discriminatory format auctions, they are also in the auctions
where all participants face a maximum bidding limit based on their capital basis
than in auctions where only brokerage houses, suggesting that leveling the
competition ground among participants in the Mexican primary auctions indeed aid
to reduce price differentials.  However, in spite of evidence that auction reopening
reduces treasury securities price differentials in Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom (even though the primary auction format differs across these three
countries), the evidence in favor of this practice shown in the present data set is
mixed.
The price differentials’ dependence on the usual factors proposed by auction
theory like bidder participation, market volatility, issuance size, and auction format
is also examined through regression analysis.  For this exercise, the starting point
is the well known paper of Umlauf (1993), which analyzes the bidding behavior in
Mexico’s 28-days CETES weekly auctions during the period of 1986-1991.  Results
from a 1996-2000 data set largely coincide with those reported by Umlauf,
although the effects associated to bidder participation, market volatility, and issue
size seem weaker both for CETES of longer maturity and for pooled least squares
regressions than for the 28-days CETES.  Following more recent work suggested
by the finance microstructure literature, the possible effects associated to the
secondary market characteristics such as liquidity, inventory costs and adverse
selection components are examined as well.  This study finds evidence supporting
the relevance of these latter factors to explain underpricing in the primary auction,
but again more strongly in estimations for 28 days CETES price differentials.
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that in addition to adopting a uniform auction
format or setting common maximum bids for all auction participants, some recent
reforms to the secondary market rules may enhance market’s efficiency.
This empirical evidence supports the relevance of resale markets.  It suggests that
future modeling of government securities auctions may benefit from including more
secondary market characteristics.  To a less extent, it also suggests that secondary
market characteristics may themselves alter significantly the way in which some
primary auction rules work in reality and thus, latter’s rules should take into account
the former’s characteristics.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some previous
results for treasury securities auction markets.  Section 3 sketches some
characteristics of the Mexican government debt market. Section 4 describes the
data set examined and explains what variables are used in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 presents the results.  Lastly, section 6 summarizes our main conclusions
and suggests some venues for further research.4
2.   Auction theory and empirical analysis for Treasury securities markets
A decade ago, most auction theory was couched in terms of a single good
auctioned at a one-time event, with each bidder submitting a single bid at the
relevant time in the auction process, and behaving according to certain restrictive
assumptions.
2  Most of these theoretical models’ predictions were extended to
treasury securities auctions, in spite of recognizing that auctions for Treasury
securities are repeated on a periodic basis and are for multiple goods, for which
bidders may submit a whole schedule of bids, some of which may be viewed as
underwriting bids; in increasing occasions there is an active well-defined when
issued market in which participants can purchase the identical good (but at a
known yield) at the time of an auction or before or after; and there is a well-defined
group of bidders, which may or may not act according to the assumptions, that
participate in virtually all auctions.
Chief among such predictions is the superiority, in terms of revenues for the seller,
of the uniform format over the discriminatory format.  It is not surprising that most
of the recent models verify the validity of this and other theoretical predictions
using assumptions that are more compatible with Treasury securities markets’
features. Several early contributors, due to the difficulty on computing of
equilibrium bidding strategies in multi-unit auctions, circumvented the analysis of
strategic bidding behavior by assuming that bidders act as price takers, which may
be plausible if the number of bidders is large as in many financial auctions.  In this
tradition, Nautz (1995) analyzes optimal bidding if the auctioneer sets a discrete
price grid.  Assuming risk neutral bidders, he showed that in a discriminatory
auction optimal bidding requires bid shading almost everywhere whereas in a
uniform auction truthful bidding is optimal.  Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997) extends
the analysis of price taking bidding to allow for risk aversion and a continuous
random stop-out price.  They show that in a discriminatory auction a risk averse
bidder should bid less aggressively than a risk neutral bidder, at each price.
However, even under risk aversion, optimal bidding requires bid shading
everywhere.  Therefore, trade is definitely inefficient.  This is in sharp contrast with
uniform auctions where truthful bidding is optimal even under risk.
Lengwiler (1999) argues that the assumption that the offered quantity is fixed is not
appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to
adjust the supply as a function of bidding, as is often the case in government
securities auctions  He addresses this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit
auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities
at constant unit costs, and (non price-taking) oligopolistic bidders.  He establishes
the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for
uniform price auctions and shows that bidders have an incentive to misreport their
true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for
                                                
2 Bihkchandani and Huang (1993) and Bartolini and Cottarelli (1994) provide excellent early surveys
of auction theory related to Treasury securities markets.5
different reasons.  Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no
unambiguous ordering among them.
Back and Zender (1993),  Wang and Zender (1998), and Ausubel and Cramton
(1998) address the issue of ranking uniform and discriminatory auctions in terms of
seller revenues, in the case of divisible goods, with smooth demand schedules.
Extending an important result by Wilson (1979), their models show that uniform-
price auctions may actually encourage implicit collusion among bidders and cost
the Treasury money by awarding the auction at too low a price.  Wang and Zender
(1998) obtain an analytical solution and fully characterize the set of equilibria under
risk neutrality and constant absolute risk aversion.  They use the common value
assumption: the good being sold has an unknown value; this is the usual
assumption for Treasury securities auctions, given the existence of a secondary
market.  In their model, assuming that the noncompetitive demand is uniformly
distributed, if bidders are risk-neutral the expected revenue in a uniform auction is
smaller than in a discriminatory auction in almost all equilibria of a uniform-price
auction.  If bidders are risk-averse, the result is ambiguous.  Ausubel and Cramton
(1998) also establish that the ranking of uniform and discriminatory auctions is
ambiguous:  they are able to construct reasonable specifications of demand where
the discriminatory auction dominates the uniform auction on expected revenue for
the seller, and equally reasonable specifications of demand where the reverse
ranking holds.  Thus, they conclude that the choice between auction formats ought
to be viewed as an empirical question that depends on the actual nature of
demands.  Other recent papers, Ausubel (1997) and Ausubel and Cramton (1999),
also show that in the multi-unit setting the uniform format is not equivalent (in terms
of the bidders’ strategies) to the English or Vickrey auction and proposes a new
ascending-bid auction applicable to treasury securities and further show their
efficiency characteristics.  Such work presumably will widen the research agenda
on auction revenue comparisons in the future.
Although a comparison between theoretical predictions and actual design of
treasury bill auctions may be interesting in its own respect, specially due to the
contrasting results produced by different models, the academic and policy-oriented
debate on the design of government securities auctions has intensified in recent
years, motivated both by the desire for more cost-effective strategies to finance
large stocks of government debt, and by the recognition that non-competitive
behavior may be a pervasive and costly feature of auctions of government
securities around the world.
3
Table 1 is an extended and updated version from a table of Scalia (1997) which
presents a set of findings about underpricing in several countries’ Treasury
securities, as reported by some recent studies.  The variable of interest in these
                                                
3 But even at some countries where the governments are issuing less debt there is an debate
concerning auction design in the face of  the possible deterioration of liquidity conditions due
precisely to the reduction the number of titles traded in the market.  The reports of Canada’s central
bank provide a good example of this case.6
studies is some measure of the difference between the price (or interest rate) at
which bidders acquire securities at the primary auction and the price (or interest
rate) at which these are resold at the secondary market.  This obeys to an
emphasis on relative performance in terms of seller revenue of alternative
securities’ auction (discriminatory or uniform format, typically) or sale mechanisms,
for which the secondary market price provides a natural comparison benchmark.
In addition, the possibility that such difference represents profits for primary auction
bidders obtained from the rest of the market participants and the Treasury in a
setting with individual or collective manipulation, which has deserved the attention
from the nonacademic audience, renders this price differential as the relevant one.
4
Notice that underpricing indeed is a common finding.  However, since its
significance and size varies among countries and among auction formats, no
immediate lesson about auction design follows.  The last two studies presented in
the table, Umlauf (1993) and Laviada and Laviada (1997), focus on the Mexican
Treasury securities auctions.
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effects of manipulability in the securities’ auctions.7
Table 1  Recent Empirical Studies about Treasury Securities Auctions
Author
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Most of this recent empirical work also is accounted by central bank studies.  For
example, one of the most extensive and well known studies is the Joint Report on
the United States government securities market.  In September 1991, in the wake
of Solomon Brothers’  admissions of deliberate and repeated violations of Treasury
auction rules beginning in 1990, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve8
and the Securities Exchange Commission undertook a joint review of the
government securities market.  The report addresses a broad range of government
securities market issues that arose directly or indirectly from the events of 1991,
including the need to strengthen enforcement of Treasury’s auction rules; the need
to automate the auctions; potential changes in Treasury’s auction technique and
debt management policies; and the role of the primary dealers.  According to the
Joint Report, the three agencies considered that any degradation in the smooth
functioning of the government securities market would result in higher costs to the
taxpayer; at that time, an increase in financing costs of only one basis point –one
hundredth of one percentage point – would cost taxpayers over $300 million each
year.  Thus, the agencies were sensitive to the need to avoid unnecessary
responses that could drive investors and market makers out of the market in
pursuing the goal of market integrity.  Last year’s adoption of the uniform auction
format for the sale of Treasury bills comes as the result of a series of designed
experiments with auction formats by the US Treasury.
In Canada, as a result of the declining amount of treasury bills, liquidity indicators
for this market deteriorated between 1997 and 1999, excluding the turbulent period
in the autumn of 1998.  Bid-offer spreads widened, while the volume of
transactions and the average coverage ratio at auctions declined. The major
changes that affected the amount and issuance of government securities, together
with the desire to maintain and enhance market liquidity and efficiency, led to a
number of initiatives on the part of the Canadian authorities and market
participants. Among the measures taken are changes to the auction rules for
treasury bills, like redefining participant’s status and maximum bids accepted, and
their oversight by the Bank of Canada, as well as the guidelines adopted by the
Investment Dealers Association of Canada.  In addition, the Bank of Canada and
the federal government have modified the bond program by creating a pilot bond
buyback program and have adjusted the treasury bill program, in order to maintain
the supply of benchmark issues.  Again, the Bank of Canada reports concern that
in a system operating under the threat of market squeezes, intermediaries would
be reluctant to take short positions on the when-issued market and to engage in
other market-making activities, or to participate in auctions and in the secondary
market.  Investors would also face a less-liquid and less-efficient market, and
would be less active at auctions and in the secondary market.  In addition,
financing costs could rise for many issuers, including the federal government and
others whose securities are priced against government benchmark issues.
What these two examples illustrate is that the policy-oriented debate goes a long
way beyond aspects regarding auction technique choice.  However, the choice
between a uniform or a discriminatory auction format is one that has received
much attention.
There are other technical aspect about auctions of concern.  For example, studies
about UK’s Italy’s, and Spain’s securities’ auctions test for the effects on
underpricing from increasing the securities’ liquidity through various means.  For
the UK’s gilts (sold with a discriminatory format),  Breedon and Ganley (1996) get9
the standard result of the auction stock being underpriced relative both to the
parent and the when-issued price in non-fungible auctions (i.e., auctions where the
tranche trades on a slightly different basis from the parent for a period after the
auction) and that when-issued trades deviate substantially from the parent even
after the auction; but in fully-fungible auctions (i.e.,  auctions where the parent and
the tranche are identical on auction day),  introduced by the Bank of England in
early 1994, no significant underpricing is found and the when-issued trades very
close to the parent throughout.
Scalia (1997)  analyzes the uniform price auctions of Italian Treasury bonds, where
each issue is reopened regularly in order to improve information aggregation and
increase the availability of each security.  It shows that: i) as concerns the initial
auctions, the discount based on when-issued prices before the auction is not
statistically significant; ii) in the reopenings, employing a data set which includes all
secondary market trades at firm level, both the market-average and the individual
discounts are not significantly different from zero.  These conclusions indicate that
the uniform auction mechanism is revenue efficient for the Italian Treasury and
provide support for the proposals aimed at introducing the practice of reopening in
other countries.  Mazón and Núñez (1999) analyzes the hybrid auction of Spanish
Treasury bonds,
5 where auctions are also reopened, and finds similar results.
While for initial auctions underpricing is statistically significant and with a mean
value higher than the secondary market bid-ask spread, for reopening auctions the
underpricing is statistically significant but with a mean value that is smaller than the
secondary market bid-ask spread and much smaller than the mean value for initial
auctions.
Many of the empirical studies also examine other determinants of auction
underpricing,  like uncertainty about the true value of the security (which may be
due to the economic outlook, expectations for movement in absolute or relative
interest rates, and any other factors affecting the portfolio decisions of dealers and
investors) and the level of competition among bidders.  However, they differ in the
proxies used for such variables, in the inclusion of other explanatory variables and
in the results they obtain.  Since there is no generally accepted model for multiple-
unit and multiple-bid auctions with a resale market, empirical models are somehow
ad hoc, and the inclusion of variables as regressors for the auction underpricing
relies on the grounds of having some weight in the determination of the auction
price in some of the predictions of the existing theoretical models.  Most predictions
are still based on one unit auction theory.  Data availability, of course, is another
important issue that determines variable usage.
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that the accepted volume and the weighted average price of accepted bids are determined,
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Among the first empirical studies of this kind is Umlauf (1993), which analyzes
bidding behavior in Mexican Treasury securities auctions for the period 1986-1991.
Umlauf presents results of ordinary least squares regressions of profit margins
using proxies for information dispersion, bidding risk, competition, and event-
specific dummies as explanatory variables.  His results suggest that the presence
of collusion among large bidders throughout a large portion of the sampling period
and the presence of information asymmetries between small and large bidders.
They also suggest that bidders account for the winner’s curse and that participants
bid more cautiously when uncertainty is high.  Finally, they also suggest his best
know conclusion: bidders’ profits fell dramatically in 1990 when the Mexican
Treasury substituted uniform for discriminatory pricing to combat collusion and to
increase auction revenues.  This conclusion is confirmed by Laviada and Laviada
(1997) with a data set covering the 1995-1997 period.
This discussion is continued in more detail in section 4. Other key hypotheses
about the effects of factors other than auction format, like market uncertainty,
competition, etc., are presented there and are also related with the data and
variables employed for this study.
3.  Mexican Government Securities Market and Auction Techniques
If securities’ primary auction prices are indeed affected by factors such as the
economic outlook, expectations for movement in absolute or relative interest rates,
and any other factors affecting the portfolio decisions of dealers and investors, or
by competition level, then Umlauf (1993)’s results about Mexican securities primary
auctions’ may well deserve to be revisited.  Starting in 1988 a very fast and deep
process of financial deregulation began.  Landmarks of the deregulation process
up to the present time include, among others: the liberalization of interest rates, the
abolishment of required reserves on banks’ liabilities, the abolishment of selective
credit controls, the creation of instruments to simplify the acquisition of stock in
Mexican firms by foreigners, the liberalization of the investment regime of mutual
funds, the arise of “stock market specialists”, the privatization of commercial banks
(which had been nationalized in 1982), the authorization to form financial groups
among the different financial intermediaries of the system, the deregulation of
commissions charged by securities dealers, the reforms to the pension system
(including the formation of pension fund administration and investment societies),
the permission for Canadian and US financial intermediaries to operate in Mexico
through NAFTA (progressive, gradual, and up to specified market and firm level
limits), the abandonment of universal savings insurance, the modernization of the
payment system (including the adoption of “delivery against payment” practices in
operations with government securities), and, most recently, the arise of
“government securities market specialists”.
6,7   In addition, there were some
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macroeconomic reforms that affected the financial system directly, like the drastic
reduction of the fiscal deficit, the decision to finance this deficit through government
debt instruments at market interest rates, the restructuring of the government’s
external debt, which made international capital markets accessible to Mexican
institutions again, and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate.
A discussion of each of these reforms and a deep analysis of how they might be
affecting the Mexican financial market is beyond the scope of this study, but some
of them have an obvious effect.  They broaden the set of securities available for
investment (through the abolition of required reserves, the reduction of the fiscal
deficit, and the introduction of new financial instruments to simplify stock
acquisition), they mitigate market uncertainty (by making the payment system safer
or establishing market specialists to enhance securities’ liquidity), and they enlarge
the set of possible participants in the market (like the privatization and globalization
of the banking activity or the formation of pension funds investment societies),
A few data of the Mexican financial system is useful to show some of these
reforms’ effects.  For instance, in the Mexican Stock Market there are not just more
government securities but also more securities altogether available to investors.
Umlauf (1993) focuses on auctions of one-month peso-denominated zero-coupon
securities called CETES, because sufficient bid data for auctions for other
instruments are unavailable for the period  of 1986 to 1991.  He records that
outstanding issues of one-month CETES constitute an average of 25% of the face
value of Mexican Treasury debt during that sampling period.  Moreover, according
to Table 2, CETES’ outstanding issues of all maturities constitute almost 60% of
the face value of all debt instruments on average during that sampling period,
which in turn constitute 30% of all outstanding issues of securities in the Mexican
Stock Market.  The volume traded of all CETES issues constitute 84% of all debt
instruments and 81% of all securities traded then.  But the data suggests that
CETES issues, as a percentage of both all debt instruments issues and of all
outstanding securities issues are much less important by 1998, the last date that
was available for this study:  in terms of end of year market value they represent
18% of all debt instruments and 7% of all outstanding securities, while in terms of
volume traded they represent 31% of all debt instruments and 32% of all
outstanding securities.
The Mexican Treasury has also shifted its securities composition away from
CETES.  During 1986-1991 these titles represented 97% of the volume traded in
government securities, while in 1998 they represent around half of it.  This
reductions also is observed in terms of end of year market value, from an average
67% in 1986-1991 to 30% in 1998. Nonetheless, they remain as the principal
internal debt government securities and are the basis to price other government
securities.12
Table 2.  The Mexican Stock Market
Volume Traded in Million Pesos at Market Value During the Year
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 756,766 3,078,297 9,655,706 1,170,197.6 2,245,946 5,233,358 11,146,049 14,432,194 13,293,964 5,054,248 10,353,293 17,594,356 13,709,000
Variable Income Securities 37,009 230,248 175,453 35,778.8 54,601 119,603 156,466 200,225 298,646 227,322 331,720 438,315 333,100
Debt Instruments 719,757 2,848,049 9,480,253 1,134,418.8 2,191,345 5,113,755 10,989,583 14,231,969 12,995,318 4,692,141 10,021,573 17,156,041 13,375,900
     CETES 410,943 2,401,877 8,364,606 997,885.5 2,100,032 4,707,417 10,172,952 1,423,428 11,559,334 1,352,771 1,346,477 5,690,387 4,306,400
     TESOBONOS 36.6 3,345 1,005 8,588 6,215 124,118 118,626
     Bankers' acceptances 249,381 258,720 66,770 16,427.1 69 3 738 910 51 47 1,014 106,309 171,200
     Negotiable Bank Promissory Notes 447,816 2,409.7 8,671 1 4,816 5,495 1,600 157 114 517,520 2,032,800
     Commercial Paper 27,134 100,821 233,872 33,033.1 88,746 63,878 46,036 45,791 43,736 176,073 133,891 301,066 318,000
     Certificates of Deposit 203 8 8 6 500 2,800
     BONDES 64,268.1 81,875 116,563 241,774 12,135,666 581,832 1,498,714 2,002,973 3,842,527 1,889,700
     AJUSTABONOS 172.1 12,986 269,581 476,806 556,673 633,040 1,351,891 3,388,803 1,205,071 213,600
     UDIBONOS 418 2,725,578 1,600,400
     BIBS 1,191 945 620 4.4 19 0.3
     Urban Renovation Bonds 68 134 33 0.6 9 2 9
     Debentures 5,351 12,182 20,173 3,578.3 6,769 14,994 24,565 34,631 30,698 27,541 15,251 7,514 8,500
     Bankers' Bonds 9 1,359.1 11,200 6,277 2,724 11,074 10,584 5,581 12,478 15,920 165,100
     Participation Certificates (CPOS) 54 787 217.9 288 1,059 3,595 5,583 4,433 13,045 1,292 2,635 26,400
     Medium-term Promissory Notes 2,289 6,980 6,503 5,684 4,020 6,600 17,483 803,700
     Other 2,432 4,390 7,677 11,242 5,299 3,382 3,112,200 2,724,000 1,837,300
Million Pesos at Market Value at the End of the Year
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 17,860 56,041 137,887 213,328 336,643 584,491 647,547 874,316 941,001 984,744 1,203,383 1,701,900 1,522,600
Variable Income Securities 4,991 18,416 31,978 60,514 96,472 303,271 433,313 623,978 641,768 698,797 838,682 1,262,469 907,400
Debt Instruments 12,869 37,626 34,602 152,814 240,171 281,220 214,234 250,338 299,850 285,947 363,701 439,400 615,300
     CETES 8,185 28,006 42,299 53,973 72,001 72,374 59,338 81,014 40,394 48,590 62,114 94,008 111,900
     TESOBONOS 198 1,202 927 922 3,842 94,679 2,352
     Bankers' acceptances 2,676 4,875 35,718 28,749 7,827 6,310 12,617 22,103 26,173 33,983 39,718 22,300 30,900
     Negotiable Bank Promissory Notes 41 59,173 70,720 20,551 26,795 29,516 45,693 71,762 79,200 125,200
     Commercial Paper 68 160 695 4,629 6,809 4,587 2,643 3,563 4,058 4,301 2,602 13,558 21,600
     Certificates of Deposit 2,287 64 727 1,120 874 1,015 2,752 6,400
     BONDES 359 20,186 55,677 64,513 57,953 36,848 17,036 8,316 44,970 67,849 81,768 146,400
     AJUSTABONOS 3,225 14,311 38,988 36,271 33,695 28,602 39,309 25,439 15,473 10,400
     UDIBONOS 5,357 36,678 62,800
     BIBS 109 92 83 49 33 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
     Urban Renovation Bonds 7 15 18 18 20 23 23 23 8
     Debentures 198 463 1,128 2,560 4,786 10,388 17,443 20,497 20,773 26,132 23,213 21,894 18,900
     Bankers' Bonds 17 10 81 2,112 6,640 10,775 6,883 15,913 20,560 25,627 37,224 28,056 29,700
     Participation Certificates (CPOS) 2 42 175 482 3,591 11,369 10,014 10,590 8,816 14,619 25,600 24,000
     Medium-term Promissory Notes 2,249 9,261 14,665 15,060 11,603 12,788 18,017 27,000
     Other 1,591 3,646 5,619 583 1,530 48
SOURCE:  Mexican Stock Exchange and Banco de México
The number of firms is a very rough indicator of the level of competition (specially
because different financial institutions may be part of one financial group), but a
comparison between 1987 and 2000 anyway is useful to grasp the effects of some
of the reforms in the market structure.  In 1987, the major institutions of Mexico’s
financial system were 18 commercial banks,
8,9 6 development banks, 25 brokerage
houses, 79 investment funds, and 44 insurance companies.
10  At present the major
institutions are 45 commercial banks,
11 6 development banks, 26 brokerage
                                                
8 Consolidation reduced the number of institutions to 13 by 1991, for sale to the private sector.
9 Furthermore, the commercial banks at that time were not private because they had been
nationalized in 1982.  This fact is worth notice in the discussion of whether who earns the price
differential.
10 The system was complemented by 117 credit unions, 26 leasing, 14 bond guarantee, and 21
warehouses. Source:  1988 Yearly Report, Banco de México.
11 This figure includes 15 foreign banks (Citibank, JP Morgan, Bank of Boston, Bank of America,
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Chase Manhattan, BNP, GE Capital, ABN Amro Bank, American
Express, Bank One, Deutche Bank, Scotia Bank, RN Bank of New York, Dresdner Bank, ING Bank
and Comerical Bank) and 11 commercial banks intervened by the Mexican Banking and Securities13
houses, 286 investment funds, 68 insurance companies, and 13 pension funds
investment societies.  Leasing companies, money exchange houses, bond
guarantees, and credit unions also operate regularly in the market.  The financial
system is complemented by six interdealer brokers, one securities depository firm,
and six financial authorities.  Three additional financial authorities were created as
a result of some of the reforms, including a commission created to regulate and
supervise pension fund investment societies, an institute to protect bank savings,
and a commission to protect bank services’ users.  However, it is surprising that
such changes do not seem to have had an important impact on the number of
participants in the primary auctions.  Umlauf reports that during 1986-1991, on
average, over 40 bidders participated in the weekly government securities auctions
that fell into one of the first five categories mentioned before, with an average of 25
bidders submitting competitive bids in each auction during the sampling period.  In
contrast, average bidder participation in the weekly government securities auctions
during 1996-2000 is 19. At present, this bidders are banks and brokerage houses
mostly.  Hence, while there are more participants in the financial markets in
general, they do not seem to be in the primary auctions.  Thus, next it is interesting
to see whether this pattern can be linked to the primary auction rules.
The sales mechanism of CETES has gone through some modifications since these
titles were first issued in 1978.  CETES were sold on tap at a fixed interest rate
until 1982, when the issue was first auctioned using a discriminatory format.
Bidders (who even today must be either domestic banking institutions, brokerage
houses, investment funds or “persons specially authorized to bid” by the central
bank) submitted multiple sealed bids that are discount quantity pairs and a single
noncompetitive bid that specifies a quantity but not a discount (these bids are
guaranteed to win the quantities specified up to a pre specified per-bid maximum).
This procedure was substituted back with the tap during 1985-1986, because the
Mexican Treasury considered it was paying an interest rate that was too high for its
fixed issues.   Therefore, when in July 1986 the discriminatory auction format was
readopted (due to an observed decrease in the private sector’s CETES holdings), it
was established that, although the size of the issue to be auctioned would be set
beforehand, the Treasury retained the right to cancel all or part of each weekly
auction to take advantage of interest rate declines arising from macroeconomic
shocks realized in the time window between bid submission and the
announcement of results.  In addition, no single competitive bidder could purchase
more than 40% of the quantity offered to competitive bidders and brokerage
houses also were limited to submit bids for debt with aggregate face values less
than 100 times the values of their capital bases.
12  In July 1989 the maximum bid’s
level was raised to 60%. In July 1990, the uniform auction format was first
introduced in an effort to combat collusion and raise auction revenues, according to
                                                                                                                                                    
Commission (CNBV, by its initials in Spanish) that keep a balance account to for market operations
with Banco de México (Bancrecer, Unión, Cremi, Oriente, Obrero, Interestatal, Sureste, Capital,
Industrial, Promotor del Norte, and Anáhuac) during 2000, according to the roster of financial
market institutions of the General Direction for Financial System Analysis of Banco de México.
12 The latter of these rules perhaps resulted from financial authorities’ concern about default risk
among brokerage houses in the aftermath of the 1987 financial crash.14
Umlauf (1993), and was substituted with the discriminatory format in January 1993.
The uniform format was adopted once more on April 1994, but substituted with the
discriminatory format, again in November 1995, as a means to raise market
interest rates in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Table 3  CETES’ Sales Mechanisms 1978-2001
Date Mechanism
January 1978-1982 Tap with a fixed rate
1982-1985 Discriminatory auction
1985-July 1986 Tap with a fixed rate.
July 1986-July 1990 Discriminatory auction
-  Treasury retains the right to cancel part
or all of the weekly auction.
-  Brokerage houses cannot bid for debt
of more than a 100 times their capital
basis.
-  In July 1989 the miximum bid level is
raised from 40% to 60%
July 1990-January 1993 Uniform auction
January 1993-April 1994
Discriminatory auction
-  Amounts allocated to non-competitive
bids were reduced.
April 1994-November 1995 Uniform auction
November 1995- Discriminatory auction
-  No institution can bid for debt of more
than a 100 times its capital basis.
-  Banks were the only institutions
allowed to submit bids in account for
others until 2000.
-  The Treasury may increase the supply
of securities at issue in an auction.
-  Some long term titles are tendered to
pension fund investment societies.
-  Some titles are tendered to government
securities market makers (September
2000)
This is the format that prevails until present, but not without some modifications,
among which are:  1)  bid limits based on institutions capital basis were extended
to all bidders in 1995;
13  2)  all bidders must participate in the government
securities auctions on their own account; 3)  the Treasury can offer more of the
securities at issue in an auction when it considers that the bided interest rates or
prices are favorable up to a limit that keeps the interest rates or prices in line with
those of the previous issue; and 4)  the Treasury can offer more titles of a given
issue when it  observes liquidity problems.
14  Moreover, although non-competitive
                                                
13 In the aftermath of the financial crisis that began on December 1994, it seems likely that this rule
was extended to banks due to default risk fears again.  But the side products of this modifications
would be a more leveled competition ground.
14 This modification is not in the auction rules, but according to some officials of Banco de México
this measure has been put into practice for 182 days and 364 days CETES at least since 1998.15
bids have become less important throughout this period, since recently some
securities are sold directly to pension fund investment societies and, even more
recently, to government securities market specialists.
4.  Data Set and Variables
4.1  Data Set
Econometric analysis of price differentials between the primary and the secondary
government securities markets involves detailed information requirements which,
unfortunately, cannot be filled for Mexico since the first auction date to present.  So
although price differentials series can be constructed from 1988 or 1990 onwards,
depending on the security, constraints to obtained the other data bind and dictate
what samples can be examined.  There are two data sets of primary auctions
results available for this study.  One data set consists of all CETES with maturity of
28, 91, 182, and 365 days auctioned since January 1993 to May 2000.  For each
auctioned issue it contains the maturity expressed in days, the announced and
allocated quantity, the weighted allocation discount rate or price.  Auction format is
also indicated.  The other data set covers all government securities primary
auctions of the period between July 9, 1996 and May 16, 2000.  Besides the
information mentioned before, this data set contains the number of competitive
bidders and bids, both asked and allocated in each auction.  Maximum and
minimum bids asked and allocated are also contained.
This study focuses on the CETES issues because results can be compared to
those from other studies.  But, more fundamentally, because only for these
securities was possible to obtain resale prices data.  No formal when issued
market exists for government securities and most trading occurs over the counter.
To measure the new securities’ prices with those of secondary market trades of
outstanding securities is tricky because most of that trade is not in direct but in
repurchase agreements.
15  Moreover, in repurchase agreements it is a common
practice, to ameliorate liquidity problems on some issues, to bundle different
securities.
For CETES’ secondary prices there are two main sources.  First, secondary prices
can be constructed from the daily funding rate with government paper.  This is a
representative interest rate of the mayor operations carried out by commercial
banks and brokerage houses through repurchase operations with maturity of 1 day
with government securities that have been liquidated in the INDEVAL delivery
versus payment system.  Since this is the source employed by Umlauf (1993) and
Laviada and Laviada (1997), its use makes the present calculations perfectly
comparable to those.  Besides, it can be constructed for both auction data sets.
However, if investors tend to use for repurchase agreements their most liquid
                                                
15 Government securities market makers, who are to provide secondary market quotes and improve
the securities’ liquidity in the market started to operate on September 2000.16
securities, the repurchase agreement rate will underestimate the liquidity premium
of CETES with longer maturity and, in turn, will overestimate the underpricing of
this titles in the primary auction with respect to the secondary market.  In addition,
the pricing formula we employ assumes that the liquidity premium is a linear
function of maturity, when it may well be a concave, convex, or more complex
function of it.
The other source for secondary market prices is a CETES price index published by
one of the interdealer brokerage firms operating in the Mexican Stock Market,
Enlaces Prebon.  The IEP index (Enlaces Prebon Price Index, by its initials in
Spanish) for CETES corresponds to the mean market interest rate at 12:15,
determined through a survey to 12 participating institutions.
16  The three highest
and three lowest reported rates are eliminated, so the CETES average rate is
constructed from the remaining six reports. The index is constructed for CETES
with 28, 91, 182, and 365 days maturity since June of 1996.  It is worth noticing
that this are perception indexes, not executable indexes, which means that there is
no intention to buy or sell securities at the quoted rates.  This may be seen as a
disadvantage for this study purposes, although officials from Enlaces Prebon
explain that for theirs perception quotes are better than buy and sell quotes, given
that the latter tend to be biased by the traders’ according to their market positions
at the time of the survey.
17
A third source to construct secondary market prices is available from June 2000
onwards because  since then Banco de México constructs a yield curve for CETES
with the expected return rate of the CETES in circulation, based on its direct open
market operations, on direct operations among credit institutions, and the daily
funding rate.  This series is too short and lacks of the corresponding primary
auction data, so it is not used for econometric analysis.  However, auction
securities price differentials with respect to each of the other two possible
measures of the “true” price can be calculated and compared to assess their
quality. Prices are calculated from  discount rates with the formula:
Zero Coupon Bond Price=100-discount rate*maturity/360
While prices from the return rates are calculated as
Zero Coupon Bond Price=100/(1+return rate*maturity/360)
In Graph 1 it can be seen that between June 2000 and April 2001 it is observed
that the differentials calculated with the IEP and with the Banco’s yield curve seem
more correlated with each other than with differential calculated with the funding
                                                
16 Current sources for the CETES’ IEP are Banamex, Bank of America, Banorte, BBV, Bital, Chase
Manhattan, Citibank, ING, Invex, JP Morgan, Santander Mexicano and Serfin.
17 It was also explained that initially the IEP indexes were executable.  Participants were asked for a
buy quote and it was well known that there was a 20 basis point spread between buy and sell
prices.17
rate. Interestingly, their correlation is stronger for the 182 and 365 days CETES
than for the other two.  This inclusion of a daily rate also makes the Banco’s yield
curve steeper for shorter maturities, which correspond to higher average price
differentials with this measure than with the IEP.  An additional reason for this
pattern is that trades through Enlaces Prebon represent a higher proportion of all
trades for the longer maturity securities.    In terms of variability, it is observed that
the price differential constructed from the daily funding rate are more volatile than
the others.
18
Graph 1  Difference between three alternative secondary market price
measures and the primary auction price, May 2000-April 2001
Additional factors than can systematically bias calculations with the IEP and the
funding rate away from the “true” secondary market price are difficult to find,
although it is reckoned that difficultness to find would not make them unexistent.
19
But since for this study purposes there is no reason to prefer either of the two
sources over the other, all calculations are carried out and reported with both when
data is available.  Besides, errors in the measuring of the dependent variables are
                                                
18 Appendix 2.
19 Proof of this was found by chance while the possible effects of monetary policy on the CETES
price differentials between the primary and the secondary market.  It was found that the reductions
of the announced target for the banking institutions balances at the central bank, the so called
“shorts” have an effect on the price differentials constructed with the funding rate but not on those
constructed with the IEP.  Actually, this result seems to match perfectly those that the author found
about the effects of the that policy measure on the term structure of interest rates.  For this study’s




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































incorporated in the disturbance term and their existence causes no problems for
purposes of the econometric estimation and there is no reason to suspect that
either measure of the true secondary price will not be independent of the
regressors.
20
Graph 2 shows the difference between the secondary market price and the primary
auction weighted allocation price for the period of June 1996 to April 2001.  Visual
inspection reveals that price differentials constructed from the daily funding rate
indeed increase with maturity, consistent with the hypothesis that this rate
underestimates the liquidity premium of longer term government securities.
However, such underestimation is observed not just across CETES with different
maturity.  For the four securities is observed also that differentials increase through
time, especially after July of 1998, until June 2000 and then decrease somewhat.
The latter pattern does not follow immediately from such hypothesis.  Supporting
this observation, price differentials constructed from the IEP CETES rate also show
an increasing pattern for most of the period.
Graph 2  Difference between secondary market price and
the primary auction price, 1996-2001











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Yearly averages of the price differentials’, including their significance is presented
in Table 4.  Both the prices’ difference and ratio is presented because the latter can
                                                
20 Kennedy (1993).19
be compared to those of Umlauf (1993), which for 28 days CETES during the
period August 1986-May 1991 reports an average ratio between the average
resale price (constructed from the daily funding rate) and the average auction price
of 1.000171 and statistically significant; that is, 1.71 basis points.  The present
calculations reveal that actually, this measure of underpricing is negative for
CETES of all maturities during the whole 1989-1993 period,
21 but statistically
significant only sometimes and mostly for the CETES of 182 and 365 days.
Furthermore, it exhibits a tendency to become less negative, even positive, after
1993 in the four cases, albeit a mild decrease after 1999.  It is positive and
significant, nonetheless, only for the 28 days CETES during January-May 2001,
when it reaches 9 basis points.  This ‘profit” is equivalent to 9 cents per title when
measured as the price difference.
Table 4  Price Differences between the secondary market and
the primary auction, 1989-2001
IEP price Funding rate price IEP price Funding rate price
P
SEC-PPRIM PSEC/PPRIM-1 PSEC-PPRIM PSEC/PPRIM-1 PSEC-PPRIM PSEC/PPRIM-1 PSEC-PPRIM PSEC/PPRIM-1
1 month CETEs 3 months CETEs
1988 NA NA 0.13052 0.00147 NA NA 0.19196 0.00214
1989 NA NA -0.01596 -0.00016 NA NA 0.07092 0.00081
1990 NA NA -0.14021 -0.00144 NA NA -0.31690 -0.00347
1991 NA NA -0.20015 -0.00203 NA NA -0.47801 *** -0.00502 ***
1992 NA NA -0.11488 -0.00116 NA NA -0.29135 -0.00303
1993 NA NA -0.05788 -0.00059 NA NA -0.04628 -0.00048
1994 NA NA -0.03539 -0.00036 NA NA 0.01764 0.00017
1995 NA NA 0.02213 0.00023 NA NA 0.04522 0.00051
1996 -0.01863 *** -0.0002 *** 0.01182 0.00012 0.25463 0.00273 0.45960 0.00371
1997 -0.02213 -0.0002 0.00058 0.00001 0.25719 0.00271 0.33122 0.00349
1998 0.04899 0.0005 0.12014 0.00123 0.34875 0.00383 0.87390 0.00953
1999 0.11708 *** 0.0012 *** 0.15875 0.00161 0.36191 0.00386 0.73066 0.00775
2000 0.05699 * 0.0006 * 0.04800 *** 0.00049 *** 0.14880 0.00156 0.34527 0.00360
2001 0.02889 * 0.0003 * 0.00869 *** 0.00009 *** 0.21647 0.00226 0.30699 0.00321
6 months CETEs 1 year CETEs
1988
1989 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1990 NA NA -0.01985 * -0.00014 ** NA NA -2.57884 * -0.03220 *
1991 NA NA -0.88031 *** -0.00968 ** NA NA -1.79147 ** -0.02130 **
1992 NA NA -0.48235 *** -0.00521 *** NA NA -0.97676 ** -0.01143 **
1993 NA NA -0.07131 -0.00074 NA NA -0.28183 -0.00308
1994 NA NA -0.00668 -0.00011 NA NA -0.31058 -0.00367
1995 NA NA -0.39653 *** -0.00490 *** NA NA -0.82864 *** -0.01177 ***
1996 1.00562 0.01163 1.23204 0.01399 2.01881 *** 0.02679 *** 2.53507 *** 0.03027
1997 0.73004 0.00810 0.86861 0.00965 1.88112 *** 0.02310 *** 2.10782 0.02588
1998 -0.17552 -0.00143 0.75144 0.00890 1.46494 ** 0.01951 ** 3.51996 0.04549
1999 1.54906 *** 0.01757 *** 2.29940 0.02596 2.51571 *** 0.03415 *** 4.36709 0.05686
2000 0.58680 0.00642 1.12355 0.01226 1.39206 ** 0.01679 ** 2.60487 0.03108
2001 0.69847 0.00763 0.84177 0.00919 2.41605 ** 0.02901 ** 2.63552 0.03163
* 99% significance, ** 95% significance, *** 90% significance  
IEP price data of 1996 corresponds to the June-December period
All price data of 2001 corresponds to the January April period
The pattern portrayed when the prices’ ratio and difference is computed with the
IEP index is quite similar.  Secondary market prices tend to become higher,
although measures differ across both quantitatively and on statistical significance:
from 1996 on all CETES but those of 91 days maturity exhibit at least one positive
                                                
21 Insignificant price differentials during 1990 and 1991 on 28 days CETES are consistent with
Umlauf (1993) because it reports that the adoption of the uniform format at that time vanished the
profits.20
and significant price differential.  Hence, absent any factor that can dramatically
switch these patterns, the data suggests that price differentials have tended to
increase through time.
22
To what extent can these tendencies be matched with changes to the auction
format?  The present data sets allow the following comparisons:  auctions with
uniform format versus auctions with discriminatory format, auctions with capital
based limits only for brokerage houses versus auctions with capital based limits for
all participating institutions, and auctions without reopening versus auctions with
reopening. Auctions can be classified in uniform, discriminatory, reopened and not
reopened directly from the data sets.  On one hand, there is an indicator of
“uniform” or “discriminatory” auction.  On the other hand, reopened auctions can be
identified because the additional securities are tendered in a fully-fungible basis
with the existing securities, so CETES with maturity dates of 362 days or less and
of 179 days or less correspond to reopenings of 365 and 182 days CETES,
respectively.  The date for setting the same capital basis limit to all auction
participants is clearly established on September 20, 1995.
23  Basic statistics of the
price differences for these six categories are shown in Table 5.  Their statistical
significance is not high, but their size and sign do support some well known auction
design hypotheses.
                                                
22 The proportion of trades with CETES of all trades with government securities determining the
daily funding rate may be a factor that affects the difference between this rate and the CETES rates.
So the correlation between these two variables is checked, between monthly series from 1996 to
2001, and found to be low.  Unfortunately, this exercise cannot be done including 1993 or 1988,
when the largest changes in the CETES proportion of government securities happened.
23 It was either unavailability of precise dates or of large enough samples that precludes examining
the other format changes.  The introduction of government securities market specialists is specially
interesting because of the noticeable decrease on average price differentials after 1999, however,
at present the sample of auctions in which these specialists operate is scant.21
Table 5  Price Differences between the secondary market and






















Promedio -0.185 na 0.798 0.527 0.865 0.527 -0.061 na -0.560 -0.344 -1.134 -1.988
Desv. Est. 1.561 na 1.995 1.411 2.397 1.408 0.594 na 4.504 1.882 10.925 2.179
Máximo 6.579 na 10.530 10.359 10.530 10.359 4.351 na 7.620 3.160 6.280 1.880
Mínimo -7.644 na -13.794 -14.730 -13.794 -14.730 -4.880 na -21.260 -35.290 -12.560 -8.570
28 days CETEs
Promedio -0.014 na 0.043 0.031 0.057 0.031 -0.021 na 0.003 0.020 na na
Desv. Est. 0.050 na 0.032 0.040 0.036 0.040 0.034 na 0.056 0.203 na na
Máximo 0.965 na 0.815 0.559 0.815 0.559 0.965 na 1.020 0.492 na na
Mínimo -0.828 na -2.403 -2.595 -2.403 -2.595 -0.828 na -2.462 -2.635 na na
91 days CETEs 
Promedio 0.009 na 0.439 0.290 0.511 0.290 0.001 na -0.142 0.023 na na
Desv. Est. 0.492 na 0.288 0.126 0.283 0.126 0.342 na 0.743 0.320 na na
Máximo 3.044 na 2.860 2.088 2.860 2.088 3.044 na 2.697 1.176 na na
Mínimo -2.269 na -1.622 -0.445 -1.087 -0.445 -2.269 na -4.896 -0.888 na na
182 days CETEs 
Promedio -0.292 na 0.967 0.721 1.139 0.721 -0.184 na -0.847 -0.477 1.332 0.313
Desv. Est. 1.860 na 2.073 2.054 2.124 2.054 1.437 na 5.230 1.717 1.107 0.291
Máximo 4.351 na 5.016 2.354 5.016 2.354 4.351 na 4.352 1.246 3.148 1.154
Mínimo -4.880 na -13.794 -14.730 -13.794 -14.730 -4.880 na -15.825 -17.085 -0.864 -1.429
364 days CETEs
Promedio -0.598 na 2.416 1.492 2.083 1.492 -0.072 na -3.313 -3.505 -1.808 -2.729
Desv. Est. 4.850 na 4.112 3.743 5.843 3.743 1.158 na 21.812 5.326 11.473 3.926
Máximo 6.579 na 10.530 10.359 10.530 10.359 2.758 na 7.620 3.160 6.280 1.880
Mínimo -7.644 na -1.914 -1.913 -7.644 -1.913 -1.565 na -21.260 -35.290 -12.560 -8.570
Price differentials tend to be lower in uniform auctions than in discriminatory
auctions.  This finding coincides with previous results for the Mexican government
securities auctions presented in Umlauf (1993) and Laviada and Laviada (1997)
because for all and for each type of CETES’ price differentials of the discriminatory
auctions are either positive or less negative than those of the uniform auctions,
regardless of the secondary price employed in the calculations.  Furthermore,
notice (back in Table 4) that increases in the CETES’ price differentials follow the
adoption of the discriminatory format in 1993 and in 1996 while decreases in all
CETES’ price differentials follow the adoption of the uniform format in 1990 (except
in 365 days CETES) and 1994 (except in 182 and 365 days CETES), although
they did not fall continually in 1990-1993.  Actually, their growth through that period
may have contributed to the switch back to the discriminatory format in 1994.  The
financial authorities may have detected that collusion under the uniform format, as
Back and Zender (1993), Wang and Zender (1998) and Ausubel and Cramton
(1998) predict, was increasing as auction participants became more
knowledgeable on the mechanism and preferred changing the game rules as a
more cost effective solution than promoting a complex antitrust case with a
fledgling Federal Competition Commission.
24
                                                
24 Umlauf (1993) reports collusion as being one of the main reasons for adopting the uniform format
on 1990.  It is worth noting that it is only since 1993, with the approval of an antitrust law and the22
On the other hand, average price differentials in the auctions where all participants
are subject to limits based on capital basis are lower than in the auctions where
only brokerage houses are subject to such limits. This is true also for all CETES
and for each CETES type individually.  Therefore, subjecting all participants to a
common standard seems to level the competition ground and, as a result, to
reduce price differentials.
The statistics for not reopened and reopened auctions are mixed.  But reopening
an auction actually may generate opposite effects.  On one hand, reopening
auctions may reduce price differentials because the additional supply improves the
securities’ liquidity.  But, on the other hand, the additional supply may as well
increase price differentials if it produces further market uncertainty.  At first glance,
the lower average price differential associated to the latter for all CETES matches
results available for Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom supporting the first effect.
But this may just reflect that 182 and 365 days CETES auctions are those
commonly reopened and are the ones exhibiting most negative differentials in the
data set.  This conjecture is confirmed by the fact that the average price
differentials are higher for 182 and 365 days CETES when there is reopening than
when there is not. Further examinations, presented in Appendix 2, reveal that for
182 days CETES price differentials are higher on the week before the reopened
auction than on the reopened auction, supporting that the Treasury chooses to
reopen securities with high price differentials and that this practice improves
liquidity, but reveals the opposite for 365 days CETES.  The evidence of the effects
on the securities not being reopened is mixed as well because while the pattern for
28 days CETES resembles the one for 182 days CETES, the pattern for 91 days
CETES  resembles the one for 365 days CETES. Hence, tests are not conclusive
in favor of either of the two hypotheses and cannot be matched with pattern
changes from 1997 to 1998.
In sum, format changes do not fully account for the increasing price differentials in
the CETES auctions.  Although more tests regarding auction format are tested
through the addition of dycothomic variables in the regression analysis of section 5,
these results deem necessary to look at the other factors:  market uncertainty,
competition level, size of the issue, secondary market liquidity, etc.  The variables
employed to account for these and other factors are described next.
4.2   Variables
Auction price differentials
From the four price differential measures discussed before, the price difference
between the secondary market price, constructed with either the funding rate or the
                                                                                                                                                    
creation of an antitrust commission, that non-competitive practices are prohibited and punished in
Mexico.23
IEP CETES rate, and the primary auction price are those chosen to be used as
dependent variable of all this study’s regressions.  These variables are labeled as
DIFFR and as DIFIEP, respectively.
Past experience
The lagged endogenous variable would have a negative impact on the
endogenous variable, if auction participants learn from the past and tend to reverse
large profits or losses through their bidding strategy.  This hypothesis is presented
and tested in Scalia (1997).  In addition, early estimations showed that an
autorregresive term could be appropriate for econometric reasons.
25  As a result,
an AR(1) process is included in the present estimations.
Market uncertainty
The variance of the daily funding rate with government securities over the five-day
period leading to and including the day of auction execution (VARFR) is used to
proxy resale risk and information dispersion, as in Umlauf (1993) and Laviada and
Laviada (1997).
26  It is hypothesized that when the predictability of the funding rate
is low, so is the predictability of demand for CETES. Thus, it is expected to observe
a positive correlation between the variance of the funding rate and the CETES
price differential if bidders are risk-averse and/or equilibrium expected profits
increase when ex ante information disparities between bidders increase (provided
this regressor indeed proxies for such information disparities).  However,  a
negative coefficient associated to this coefficient may be considered consistent
with the interpretation that variance of the funding rate is capturing propagation of
information, not its dispersion.
27  The model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
predicts that under the assumption that traders may acquire information at some
cost, the arrival of information in the market causes an increase in intraday
volatility.  Therefore, since the availability of information reduces the winner’s
curse, the latter would then be inversely related to price volatility, and consistent
with the winner’s curse effect on auction discount.
The Mexican Treasury’s practice of suspending issues of longer term securities
during episodes of financial turmoil suggests that  including an indicator variable for
such periods of high market volatility (DHIGHVOL) may be appropriate.  Thus,
such variable is constructed and added to the model expecting to find that it
exhibits a positive coefficient.
                                                
25 This possibility also is discussed in Umlauf (1993).
26 This is done despite of this variable’s recognized limitations as a proxy for resale price
predictability due to the extent to which government securities prices created by rolling over daily
repurchase contracts may differ from CETES prices.
27This argument is previously presented in Scalia (1997).  Nevertheless, he reckons in his study that
there are no clear arguments for the Admati-Pfleiderer model in the context of the Italian Treasury
bond market .24
Bidder participation and competition level
Participation is measured by the number of bidders submitting at least one
competitive bid (BIDDERS).  It may have a positive or a negative effect on the
auction price differential.  These predictions comes from single-unit single bid
auction models with a finite number of players, where the effect of an increase in
the number of players is ambiguous.  On one hand, when the number of bidders
increases the winner’s curse is more severe, inducing lower bidding, and hence
increasing auction price differentials.  On the other, an increase in the number of
bidders implies in increase in competition, reducing the probability of winning, and
therefore inducing higher bidding and hence decreasing auction price differentials.
Wilson (1988) and Bihkchandani and Huang (1993) argue that the increase in
competition is the stronger of both effects.  There is also a prediction of a zero
coefficient associated to this variable, if the majority of the variation in this
regressor is attributed to the entry and exit of smaller bidders who are presumed to
be poorly informed.  This implication comes from Englebrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom
and Weber (1983).  Empirical evidence for this variable is mixed, as well: at least
Umlauf (1993) and Mazón and Núñez (1999) find a positive sign and Spindt and
Stolz (1992), Berg 1997) and Scalia (1997) finds a negative sign.
The cover ratio (COVER), defined as the competitive volume of bids over
competitive volume accepted is included also, to proxy for the competition level.  In
multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions an increase in participation does not necessarily
imply an increase in competition, because the offered volume may vary as well.
This possibility is supported in the Mexican data by the fact that the correlation
between BIDDERS and COVER is low.
28  It is expected to have a negative effect
on auction price differentials, as most of the above mentioned studies find.
The range of winning bids (RBIDASIG) is also included as a proxy for the degree of
competition in this study because it is used by Umlauf (1993).  He suggest two
different effects.  On the one hand, if the auction is competitive, the ex post
dispersion of bids will proxy for disparities in ex ante estimates of bidders.  On the
other hand, a wider dispersion of prices may suggest partial or complete failure of
cartel members to rig their bids collectively.  The former effect suggests a positive
coefficient (which in turn would be consistent with a positive coefficient associated
to VARFR), while the latter suggests a negative one.  He finds weak evidence of
the latter effect his study of the Mexican auctions.
It is interesting to notice, however, that a positive coefficient could also be obtained
if RBIDASIG proxies market uncertainty instead.  This is the way it is included in
Mazón and Núñez (1999), which conjectures that the dispersion in the bidders’
submitted prices would decrease with an increase in the information set available
to them.  This is the sign that they find in the Spanish auctions.
                                                
28 See Table A3.1 in Appendix 3 for further detail.25
Quantity sold
The announced quantity to be sold (ISSUESIZE) may have a negative effect on
auction price differentials.  Umlauf (1993)  argues that incentives to deviate from
cartel equilibria are strongest during larger auctions when gains from price cutting
are largest.  A negative correlation between this regressor and auction profitability
in the cartel sample regression would suggest that collusion breaks down in larger
auctions.  However, Umlauf (1993) finds the coefficient associated to this variable
to be insignificant in the Mexican auctions,
29 while and Laviada and Laviada (1997)
finds it to be positive.  Laviada and Laviada (1997) argues that auction participation
is highly concentrated in Mexico and, as a result, greater quantities sold may not
be enough to increase competition.
The CETES kind proportion of all CETES being offered in the same auction date
(PCETES) is included as well.  Not only because the relative abundance of a title
may affect its price differential, but because having different titles auctioned
simultaneously may affect the bidders’ strategies.  It is hypothesized that both of
this considerations reduce price differentials, so a negative sign is expected.
Secondary market liquidity, inventories and risk
The number of outstanding CETES in the secondary market of  the same issue
being auctioned (OUTINSEC) is included to proxy the security’s liquidity in the
secondary market.  The fact that a bond with the same original maturity as the one
being auctioned is outstanding in the secondary market may affect both the supply
and the demand side of the auction, and therefore auction prices. This variable can
have either a positive or a negative effect:  larger outstanding quantities may imply
lower pressure on the Treasury to issue a bigger quantity, and then a positive sign
on auction price differentials could be expected.  But on the other hand, if this
variable gives some quantity information to bidders, then a negative effect on
auction price differentials could be expected.
30
If the number of outstanding CETES in the secondary market is a good proxy of
the securities’ trade, the literature on financial microstructure
31 provides another
explanation for a negative coefficient on this variable.  Bid ask spreads would be
expected to vary inversely with the number of securities traded for at least two
reasons.  First, high volume securities generally require the specialist to maintain
less inventory relative to the volume of transactions.  The greater the volume the
                                                
29 Breedon and Ganley (1996) also includes the size of the auction issue, but as a proxy of the
issue’s liquidity. It finds a positive but insignificant correlation among this variable and price
differentials in United Kingdom’s gilt auctions.
30 Similar variables to capture this effect are included in Breedon and Ganley (1996) and Mazón and
Núñez (1999).  The first paper includes the size of the parent security and finds an insignificant
positive correlation with parent-tranche differential.  The second paper includes the amount of
securities maturing at the auction date (the complement of the variable employed here) and finds an
insignificant negative coefficient.
31 This hypothesis goes back at least to Demsetz’s classical article of 1968.26
more closely buy and sell orders are likely to match up without the need for a large
inventory buffer.  Second, the specialist must spend some minimum amount of his
time even on inactive issues.  More active securities probably require more time to
handle but the increase is likely to be less than proportional.  Thus, a smaller time
commitment and inventory buffer per transaction would be needed the higher the
volume traded.   Lower bid ask spreads in the secondary market presumably would
translate into lower auction price differentials.
32
Finance microstructure literature also suggests that low priced securities may tend
to have higher percentage spreads for several reasons.  Price discontinuities,
33 the
tendency of limit orders to be set at even values (whole numbers before halves
then quarters and then eighths), the fixed costs of executing a transaction and the
desire of specialists to set their spreads high enough to permit room to maneuver
would all tend to place a minimum value on the spread.  This minimum is
proportionately greater on a low priced than a high priced security. There may also
be an element of risk involved in this relation between price and percentage
spread.  Branch and Freed (1977) mention that there is a widespread belief among
investors and others that low priced securities are risky.  The margin restriction on
low priced securities reflects this view.  Whether the view is correct or not, if
investors and specialists view low priced securities as tending to be risky, they will
act accordingly and the result is likely to be larger percentage spreads on low
priced securities.  To test for this kind of effects (which, unfortunately is not
possible to disentangle) the reciprocal of the secondary market price (1/P, where
either P=Funding rate price or P=IEP price, as appropriately) is included and a
negative sign is expected.
The average bid size (AVGBID) is included as a proxy of a third kind of transaction
costs suggested by finance microstructure literature.
34   This literature suggests a
component of transaction costs associated to the fact that market makers may
trade with unidentified investors who have superior information.  When  asymmetric
information exists, informed traders profit by submitting orders that will be
correlated with future price changes.  Rational market makers in a competitive
environment widen bid ask spreads beyond what it would otherwise be to recover
from uninformed traders what they lose (on average) to the informed traders.  This
additional widening is called the adverse selection component because the market-
makers face adverse selection in their order flows.  Larger bids carry larger
                                                
32 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) analyzes a model in which investors with different expected
holding periods trade assets with different relative spreads.  The resulting testable hypothesis is that
market-observed expected return is an increasing and concave function of the spread.  Their tests
of this hypothesis, which is consistent with the prediction made above, with expected returns and
bid-ask spreads data of NYSE stocks find empirical results consistent with the model.
33 For example, in the US stock prices are quoted in no smaller units than eighths unless the price
falls below a dollar.
34 This literature includes, among others, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Glosten and
Harris (1988), George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1998).27
adverse selection effects,
35 which in turn translate into higher auction price
differentials.  Hence, the hypothesized sign is positive.
Both the matrix of crossed correlations among these variables and their basic
statistics are presented for further consultation in Appendix 3.  But there are some
features of the data worth to be emphasized here.  First, the strongest correlation
with price differential are exhibited by the BIDDERS variable, although this
correlation is high for 28 days CETES and diminishes for the longer term CETES
(even becoming negative for 365 days CETES).  This suggests some endogeneity
among them that can be explained because higher expected returns generate
more willingness to participate among potential bidders.  Since this feature may be
better accounted for with two stage least squares (TSLS) than with ordinary least
squares (OLS), both sets of estimations will be carried out.
36  Unsurprisingly,
ISSUESIZE and OUTINSEC exhibit a high cross correlation among them that also
tends to diminish with CETES maturity, most likely as a result of the auction issuing
calendar.  But it was decided to include both anyway because, besides it is
assumed that they account for different sources of effects, adding the latter does
not affect substantially the former’s sign, size or significance in regressions. Lastly,
correlations do vary across CETES of different maturity for other variables,
especially in the comparison of 28 and 91 days CETES against 182 or 365 days
CETES, suggesting that regression results may vary across as well.
Graph 3 and Table 6 provide another glance at four of these factors regarded as
the most important ones in empirical analysis of Treasury auctions.  These factors,
namely volatility of the bond market (as proxied with funding rate volatility),
coverage, issue size and number of outstanding securities in the secondary
market, are graphed along with each CETES price differential.  Bond market
volatility seems to have a mild decreasing tendency throughout the analysis period,
excepting for the early months of the 1995 financial crisis which produce a high
yearly average.  Falling price differentials are also observed in that period and
ultimately led to suspending the CETES of longer maturity until 1996.  In the period
1996-2000, coverage fluctuates between 3 and 4 (except for a value of 6 in 28
days CETES during 2000) indicating a quite constant competition level throughout
time and across securities.  Lastly, both the issue size and the number of
outstanding CETES in the secondary market exhibits an obvious upward tendency.
Hence, at this level of analysis only the last two exhibit a pattern that can be
reconciled with one of the hypothesis mentioned above in order to explain the
observed increases in the CETES’ price differentials.
                                                
35 The results of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1998) point to a strong and negative cross-sectional
relation between the average trade size and estimated fixed and variable costs of transacting per
share, consistent with strategic trading.
36 These are a common finding and a common way to proceed in this kind of empirical study, which
most of the time lead to similar results, however.28
Graph 3  Price differentials, funding rate volatility, issue size, coverage ratio,
and outstanding securities in the secondary market, 1993-2000
Price differential, funding rate volatility, coverage ratio, issue size, 
and outsanding securities in the secondary market
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Coverage ratio Funding rate variability
Outstanding securities in S.M. Issue size
Price differential w.r.t. Funding rate price29
Table 6  Funding rate volatility, issue size,
1 coverage ratio,
 2 and outstanding
securities in the secondary market, 1989-2000
3
28 days CETES 
Year   Funding rate       Issue Coverage    Outstanding
volatility size        ratio  Securities in S.M.
1989 6.6555 NA NA NA
1990 5.7480 NA NA NA
1991 2.3452 NA NA NA
1992 1.0877 NA NA NA
1993 1.1170 631.0577 2.0726 2,889.2476
1994 0.4465 506.9231 2.7044 2,399.8196
1995 13.9066 1,012.5000 2.3339 4,837.8688
1996 0.7733 900.0000 3.1304 4,500.0000
1997 0.6779 811.5385 3.3175 3,969.2308
1998 0.9284 1,435.2941 3.8052 6,556.8627
1999 0.4890 2,755.7692 3.4293 13,721.1538
2000 0.1542 3,081.8182 6.0240 15,081.8182
91 days CETES
Year   Funding rate       Issue Coverage    Outstanding
volatility size        ratio  Securities in S.M.
1989 6.9493 NA NA NA
1990 3.6494 NA NA NA
1991 3.9736 NA NA NA
1992 1.0877 NA NA NA
1993 1.1170 524.2308 2.9227 6,921.0518
1994 0.7449 488.4314 3.2007 6,963.9280
1995 9.8671 929.8077 3.0660 11,488.5125
1996 1.1541 920.1923 3.8921 12,863.4615
1997 0.7034 1,103.7736 4.3169 14,252.8302
1998 1.0708 2,225.0000 3.3552 28,111.5385
1999 0.4132 3,378.8462 3.9215 48,009.6154
2000 0.1542 4,100.0000 4.1944 56,918.1818
182 days CETES
Year   Funding rate       Issue Coverage    Outstanding
volatility size        ratio  Securities in S.M.
1989 NA NA NA NA
1990 1.8538 NA NA NA
1991 3.9736 NA NA NA
1992 1.0993 NA NA NA
1993 1.1170 544.0385 3.6174 14,326.4876
1994 0.4421 519.2000 3.7641 15,762.2400
1995 12.7070 947.2973 3.1381 15,344.5369
1996 1.1876 857.1429 3.7612 20,574.0163
1997 0.6779 1,107.6923 4.3117 25,598.0769
1998 0.6273 1,891.4286 4.1825 45,626.2857
1999 0.4260 1,346.0526 4.0364 15,732.8947
2000 0.1869 2,880.0000 3.7474 34,945.0000
365 days CETES
Year   Funding rate       Issue Coverage    Outstanding
volatility size        ratio  Securities in S.M.
1989 NA NA NA NA
1990 3.4206 NA NA NA
1991 3.4314 NA NA NA
1992 1.1713 NA NA NA
1993 1.1170 631.4387 4.1808 NA
1994 0.4421 513.2000 4.0389 32,316.0835
1995 19.2441 668.8381 2.4505 20,233.3714
1996 1.1541 544.2308 3.5478 19,482.4615
1997 0.6779 826.9231 4.5041 32,603.8462
1998 0.4007 1,402.9412 4.0522 53,929.4118
1999 0.4260 1,003.9474 2.8677 34,071.0526
2000 0.1838 4,720.0000 3.8090 43,250.0000
1  and 2: In thousands of pesos
3  Yearly averages
5.  Results
Results from the OLS estimations are presented in Table 7.  It is interesting to
focus on the 28 days CETES regressions that use the difference with respect to
the price implied in the daily funding rate first because these are more comparable
with Umlauf (1993) and Laviada and Laviada (1997).  Umlauf’s estimations are
reproduced (to the extent that the present data allow) in Appendix 3 for further
comparison.
The regression’s constant, BIDDERS, and ISSUESIZE all have a positive and
significant coefficient and RBIDASIG is not significant, as in those previous studies.
In contrast with them, VARFR is found to be not significant, perhaps due to the
daily funding rate for government securities tracking less closely CETES’ specific
volatility as their participation in the government debt market decreases.
37  Instead,
DHIGHVOL is positive and significant, so the result that volatility increases
underpricing as a result of bidders being risk averse or of large ex ante information
disparities existing among them is captured in these estimations.  PCETES is not
significant, which suggests that there is no price effect associated to changing the
                                                
37 However, this measure of volatility is highly correlated with other measures available, like stock
price index volatility, which do not track CETES volatility more closely either.30
proportion of 28 days CETES among total CETES being auctioned (notice that for
the other CETES this variable is negative, although significant for 91 and 182
CETES only, suggesting that increasing those securities’ proportion in total CETES
being sold in an auction reduces underpricing
38).  COVER is negative and
significant, suggesting that more competition reduces underpricing.  1/P and
AVGBID are significant and their signs coincide with the finance microstructure
hypotheses set for each of them.  OUTINSEC is negative and significant,
suggesting that a larger amount of similar titles in the secondary market contribute
to  reduce underpricing as well.  This result coincides with the findings for  treasury
auctions in Spain and UK,
39 but is not fully supported by the other CETES
regressions.  Demand and supply effects of different sizes across CETES may also
explain this feature and, in turn, may arise partly as a result of the bundling of
securities with different maturity (in repurchase agreements) to ameliorate liquidity
problems which would lessen the information effects in the less liquid longer term
securities.
When the difference with respect to the IEP price is used as dependent variable
instead of the funding rate price, there are some differences for the 28 days
CETES regression: while COVER, 1/P, DHIGHVOL, and AVGBID no longer are
significant, RBIDASIG becomes significant.  Its positive sign is consistent with it
being a better proxy for information dispersion than for collusion breaking.  In both
regressions the AR(1) term is positive and less than one, consistent with the
bidding correction argument, although it is not significant in the regression that
uses DIFIEP.  Observe that  overall regression fit, as measured with the adjusted
R
2 is above 50% in both regressions.  This statistic is quite high compared to
similar studies, suggesting that the variables suggested by the finance
microstructure literature add valuable information to this kind of empirical analysis.
Results of the 91, 182 and 365 days estimations support what has been explained
so far to less extent because only the regression constant, BIDDERS, DHIGHVOL,
ISSUESIZE, and 1/P keep coefficients consistent with those in the 28 days CETES
estimations and significant in at least another security.  However, the evidence
against is not strong either because these regressions exhibit just two coefficients
with signs opposite to those of the 28 days CETES, namely PCETES and
OUTINSEC.  Although for these two variables there are explanations associated to
the Treasury’s behavior for having some effects predominating over others
differently across CETES, since such results may also be due to having smaller
samples for longer term CETES
40 or to some differing security specific conditions
an unbalanced panel is assembled with the four securities’ data series to estimate
a pooled least squares regression with fixed effects.  BIDDERS, RBIDASIG,
                                                
38 Since 1999 the Mexican Treasury changed its 182 and 364 days CETES sale schedule so that
they are sold once every two weeks or once per month instead of on a weekly basis like the 28 and
91 days CETES.
39 See Mazón and Núñez (1999) and Breedon and Ganley (1996), respectively, for more details.
40 One of the reasons why Umlauf (1993) and Laviada and Laviada (1997) concentrated on 28 days
CETES auctions is that there are more observations for this security than for the rest in the sample
period each studies.31
DHIGHVOL, PCETES, 1/P, and the fixed effects coefficients are significant.  But
this significance in the case of BIDDERS, RBIDASIG, and PCETES, which show
signs differing from those in the individual regressions, is troubling in the first two of
these variables (after all,  the coefficient associated to PCETES in the panel
regression coincides with the 28 days CETES regression and can be argued that
underpricing in that title due to its proportion reduction in the total compensates the
overpricing in the rest of the titles as their proportion increases, given that demand
is stronger for shorter term titles).
41  OUTINSEC and AVGBID are both negative
but not significant.  The positive and increasing with maturity fixed coefficients in
the regression that uses DIFFR suggests that the price differential with the primary
auction is larger for the longer term securities, as visual inspection of Graph 2 also
indicates.  Mazón and Núñez (1999) obtain the same pattern and interpret it as
another implication from market uncertainty.  However, it is not obtained in the
regression that uses DIFIEP.
On the other hand, TSLS estimation does seem to affect results also.  Signs
remain mostly unchanged, but their significance is lower than in the LS
regressions.  It is also the case with them that the results about competition level,
bidder participation, volatility and secondary market liquidity show more strongly in
the shorter term CETES.  These findings are considered just as a confirmation of
the well known weaknesses of the present empirical approach, already mentioned
in section 2, so the regressions’ results are presented in Appendix 3 for closer
appreciation.
                                                
41 However, these two sigh switches can be reconciled with there being different bidders for
different CETES types that add up to more bidders overall because BIDDERS is expected to have a
negative sign as the increased competition predominates over the winner’s curse and, consistent
with this, as collusion breaks RBIDASIG can also become negative (notice this variable is positive
but not significant for the three longer term CETES regressions, suggesting it is not a good
information dispersion proxy in them).32
Table 7  OLS regression results, CETES 1996-2000 data set























RBIDASIG 0.006 0.307 0.733 0.063 -0.001
*





















*** -0.012 0.016 0.001
AVGBID 0.196

















2 0.644 0.666 0.536 0.766 0.862
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 196 189 133 104 570











C 2.271 -3.411 -5.247 14.029
***
COVER -0.077 0.044
** -0.015 -0.080 0.001
BIDDERS 0.001
* 0.007




* -0.167 0.056 -0.001
*
VARFR -0.003 0.006 -0.071 -0.037 -0.047
***
DHIGHVOL 0.027 0.579
* -0.420 0.698 -0.163
ISSUESIZE 0.001
* -0.007





1/PFIEP -0.227 0.381 0.667 -0.657 0.333
OUTINSEC -0.020
** 0.011
** -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
**











2 0.533 0.372 0.257 0.753 0.706
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 196 189 131 104 570
*, 
** and 
***: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively, using Newey-West adjusted standard errors.
1: Unbalanced panel estimated as pooled least squares regression with fixed effects and White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.
Overall, these estimations provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the
observed underpricing tendencies in the CETES may be connected to a set of
factors less emphasized by auction theory.  While they show evidence in favor of
competition level, bidder participation and market uncertainty as reasons for price
differences to increase between primary and secondary markets, these variables’
observed time trends suggest these differences should be constant or decreasing
through time.  Thus, other factors may be playing an important role.  Secondary33
market’s microstructure is a factor worth further research in the future because
more powerful measures of liquidity, inventory, and adverse selection effects can
be constructed as better secondary market data are collected.  For example, two
facts may suggest that adverse selection problems are increasing in the Mexican
market.  First, if it is assumed that foreign banking institutions and mutual funds or
the pension fund investment societies are, besides in many occasions more
sophisticated that the rest of the participants,  “better informed” than the
participants in the primary auctions, their increased number in the Mexican
financial markets would tend to raise the adverse selection component of their
trades. The recently adopted practice of tendering of some long term titles directly
to pension funds outside the primary competition may be a result of this kind of
consideration being in the financial authorities’ minds.  The second factor relates to
the fact that at present and since not later than 1995 participants in the primary
auction can only submit bids on their own account.  If it is assumed that
participants perceive bidding to get securities that they will resale immediately to
customers as riskier when they have to bid on their own account than when they
can bid on their customers’ accounts (perhaps due to different default risks in the
operations), this rule would also tend to increase spreads. Observe that average
bid size exhibits an increasing tendency and is found to have a positive sign, in
spite its significance is weak in several regressions.  But what may be provoking
that increase in addition to just an increase in the issue size given a fixed set of
participants is not evident from the auction rules and, most predictions about
bidding behavior regard either the number of bids or the whole bid demand
(besides it can be questioned if this variable is a good proxy of secondary market
adverse selection problems).  Another obvious factor worth future research is to
allow for more complex bidding strategies for the bidders because besides bid size
bidders can choose entering or not to one or many auctions based on, for example,
their secondary market positions.  For example, many countries compute
maximum bidding limits for auction participants discounting them by the amount of
an issue they already have to mitigate market squeezes.  This calls also to allow
for more complex selling techniques because the counterpart of what is just said is
a seller that decides increasing the size of the issues being offered in the primary
auction and whether to offer them or not, again given existing amounts in the
secondary market, for example.  As was mentioned before, evidence for Mexico is
that the government is shifting its securities’ supply from shorter term CETES to
longer term CETES and from these to even longer term BONDES and BONOS,
which could not be included in the present study.
Due to the importance attributed to auction format we present a set of regressions
exploring the three changes to the Mexican auction rules explained before.
Estimations are carried out with the 1993-2000 data set which is less complete
(BIDDERS, RBIDASIG, and AVGBID cannot be constructed and only DIFFR can
be used as dependent variable), but permits to evaluate the effects on price
differentials associated to the classical problem of choosing between a uniform and
a discriminatory format and to setting common maximum bidding limits (recall such
measures were implemented before June 1996).  But to the extent that the omitted
variables are significant in the previous analysis, the following results may be34
biased and must be taken with the applicable cautions.
42  Three dycothomic
variables are defined as follows:  DISCRIMINATORY (=1 if the auction has
discriminatory format and =0 if the auction has uniform format), DCAPITAL (=1 if
only brokerage houses face maximum bidding limits and =0 if all participants face
maximum bidding limits) and DREOPEN (=1 if  the auction is reopened and =0 if is
not).  It is hypothesized that the coefficients associated to the first two variables are
positive and that the last one is negative (however, DREOPEN is not included in
the 28 and 91 days CETES regressions because these securities are not subject to
reopening).
Table 8  OLS regression results, CETES 1993-2000 data set















COVER 0.004 -0.014 0.023 0.006 0.009
**
ISSUESIZE 0.089 -0.675
* 0.082 -0.200 0.042
PCETES -0.086 0.933
** -0.403 0.811 -0.948
*





































2 0.303 0.537 0.741 0.840 0.925
Observation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F Test 379 372 298 251 1247
*, 
** and 
***: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively, using Newey-West adjusted standard errors.
1: Unbalanced panel estimated as pooled least squares regression with fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariance.
Table 8 presents the regression results.  There is some additional but limited
support to the estimations already presented.   First, while DISCRIMINATORY has
the hypothesized sign in the 91, 182, 365, and ALL CETES’ equations, only is
significant in the regressions corresponding to the two longer term CETES and to
ALL CETES.  Second, only the equation corresponding to the 28 days CETES has
a significant coefficient for DCAPITAL, but it is not of the expected sign and
contradict what is observed by comparing price differential means in the previous
section.  Third, the coefficient of DREOPEN has opposite signs in the 182 and 365
days CETES regressions and both are significant.  However, in the pooled LS
regression with ALL CETES the resulting coefficient is positively signed and
significant.  These two observations do match what is observed in the previous
section, but just confirms that the analysis of this specific format change remains
                                                
42 Comparison of Umlauf’s specification with and without bidders in the Table A3.4 of the Appendix
3 provide some grasp about omitted variables’ possible relevance.35
inconclusive.  Finally, notice that as before fixed effects coefficients are all
significant, confirming that price differentials are larger as maturity increases.
6.  Conclusions
The lack of adequate secondary market prices places extra strain for interpreting
some of the present study’s results.  But absent any factors that can produce a
systematic bias between the “true” secondary market prices and the measures
employed here, they suggest that underpricing of CETES between the primary
auction and the secondary market has been increasing in the recent years.
However,  deciding whether such findings require some kind of action by the
authorities probably needs examining first whether similar patterns are observed in
other government bonds and how these compare to other securities’ bid-ask
spreads in the secondary market.  It may seem intuitive that the latter are a floor to
the primary auction margins.  If so, it may be somewhat unfair for auction
participants that these margins are labeled “profit”.  But this is still an open
question both at the theoretic and at the empirical level.
The standard techniques employed to study what factors may be producing such
patterns, as measured with standard variables as well, provide only weak evidence
in favor of increased market uncertainty or lower competition level, which besides
are not fully consistent with these variables’ recent evolution as an explanation of
the increasing price discounts.  Better measures of them can be constructed from
data sets containing information at the bidder level, if they become available.
However, empirical studies from other countries suggest that even with better
proxies these variables’ explanatory power may not increase much.
What is just said probably is true about collusion also.  Umlauf (1993) finds
evidence of collusion about the largest auction participants from a data set with
information at the bidder level (although, to identify the collusive bidders he
additionally relies on some reports by financial officials).  This finding did not
deserve much attention then because Mexico did not have neither an antitrust
authority nor an antitrust law at the time.  While this ceased to be true in 1993, it is
puzzling that potential collusion in financial markets has received attention from
antitrust authorities only at basic levels (e.g. authorization of mergers and
acquisitions among financial intermediaries based on savings’ market
participation); furthermore, because of the concerns about market squeezes
expressed by financial authorities of markets that are more liquid, deep,
technically sophisticated, and have more participants than the Mexican markets.
This study’s findings definitely support a closer look at this factor and that will
require information at the bidder level.
It is puzzling that average auction participation has remained almost constant since
1993, given that there are more firms operating in the Mexican financial markets
that can qualify to participate in the present framework.  Current primary auction
rules still include stricter entry conditions for participants and higher maximum
bidding limits than those observed in developed markets (e.g. current bidding limits36
per participant in US and Canada are below 40%).  Such measures make market
participation thin and, therefore, it may be desirable to examine the need for them
at present times, in the light of the safer delivery against payment practices
adopted in the payment system and the availability of better monitoring
technologies.
Studying the explanatory power of other factors, like liquidity, inventory and
adverse selection costs in the secondary market, while interesting in its own sake
may also shed additional light about this phenomenon.  Despite that the proxies
employed here are somewhat weak because they are not generated from
secondary market data either, there is evidence in favor of the three of them.  The
importance of resale markets has been studied for some time in auction theory and
perhaps these features can be added to those already considered by such models
to produce specific predictions for treasury securities’ markets.  With adequate
secondary market data, the importance of having different pools of participants
across primary and secondary market or of news arrival before resale takes place,
suggested by recent models of auctions with resale, may be examined as well.
Of the recent format changes to the Mexican primary auctions, evidence of power
to reduce price differentials can be linked to uniform auctions, vis a vis
discriminatory auctions, and to auctions with common maximum bidding limits to all
participants, vis a vis auctions where the different participants face different
maximum bidding limits.  The former confirms previous findings.  The latter may be
due to the fact that participants in Mexico’s primary auctions are mostly banking
and brokerage institutions among which is not profitable to discriminate because of
the many similarities that they share and,  thus, the rule in question solely levels
the competition ground.  On the other hand, evidence about auctions reopening as
a means to reduce price differentials is more limited.  Although this may be
connected with the lack of proper price information dispersion due to the lack of a
when issued market,  without which the additional supply of securities may
exacerbate uncertainty rather than propitiate liquidity, results do not support this
alternative hypothesis clearly either.  Hence, estimating this securities demands
through the non-parametric methods employed by Feldman and Reinhart (1995)
may add useful information about it.
Government securities market specialists have been operating in the Mexican
markets only since September 2000, so this data set is not suitable to examine
what effects may they produce in price differentials.  Their obligation to offer buy
and sell quotes for  government securities continuously may improve markets’
liquidity and depth and may change the aforementioned factors in a way that
underpricing decreases, under an appropriate set of rules.  Their sole existence
has already motivated the collection of institutions’ securities positions data that in
turn may be used both to calibrate both their operation rules and the maximum
bidding limits in the primary auction, as is done in developed countries’ to avoid
market manipulability.  It was not possible to examine the effect of reserving part of
the securities for pension funds investment societies either.  Such analysis may be
important both because of these institutions’ increasing role in financial market37
operations and because the quantities allocated to non-competitive bids had been
decreasing until this measure was into place.
Finally, efficiency in government securities primary auctions and secondary market
is important for both the ability to absorb the amounts of Treasury securities made
necessary by government’s borrowing requirements at a low cost and the needs of
the central bank in conducting open market operations effectively.  It also provides
benefits to the rest of the financial market by providing a benchmark for interest
rates across the maturity spectrum.  International evidence suggests that
preserving these markets’ efficiency requires continuous supervision and reforms.
Nonetheless, even in countries with individually strong financial authorities, best
results are obtained through coordinated efforts because of the different factors
that come into play requiring multidisciplinary analyses and because of the need to
avoid unnecessary responses that may drive investors and market makers out of
the market in pursuing the goal of market integrity.
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Appendix 1
Table A1.1  Key reforms in the Mexican Financial System, 1987-2000
1987
Commercial banks are authorized to offer “Cuentas Maestras” (an instrument combining
mutual funds and checking account services), which are the first checking accounts that
pay interest in a high inflation environment.
1988
Previous limits on the amount of bankers’ acceptances issued are removed and interest
rate paid on these acceptances is liberalized. The liabilities resulting from bankers’
acceptances and guarantees no longer face the reserve requirements and selective credit
controls that are applicable to funds obtained through other instruments. Now the sole
requirement on bankers’ acceptances is a 30 per cent “liquidity ratio.”
Commercial banks are authorized to carry our repurchase agreements using bankers’
acceptances.




, financial liberalization is generalized, as the regime applicable to bankers’
acceptances is extended to all other bank instruments. Banks are authorized to invest their
domestic resources freely, subject to the sole restriction of maintaining a liquidity
coefficient of 30 percent in the form of deposits at the central bank and/or in public debt
instruments. Selective credit controls on domestic currency, and the channeling of funds to
the federal government are abolished, changing the financing of the government from
direct credit from banks to market financing by means of placing public debt on the market.
In November, firms are allowed to issue “neutral” shares which do not carry voting rights
and may be acquired by foreigners. Before this reform, foreign investment in most stocks
was limited to 49% of the total, and in many firms most of the foreign-owned capital was
held by an industrial partner.
In December, Congress approved laws fostering the placement of a greater number of
Mexican securities in international financial markets. A “Special Section” within the
National Stock Registry was created for stocks of Mexican firms to be issued in foreign
markets.
“Stock market specialists” arise. These intermediaries are permitted to trade independently
those securities in which they specialize.
Specialized firms are authorized to offer rating services for securities. A rating requirement
for commercial paper issues is established.
Brokerage houses are authorized to form (non-banking) financial groups with warehouses,
factory and leasing firms, foreign exchange houses, insurance companies, bond securities
and investment societies.
Banks social capital is open to a minority participation of foreign capital.
Unnecessary restrictions to the generation, promotion and dispersion of risk control and to
foster modernization and globalization of investment societies are eliminated.
1990
In June, the private sector is allowed once again to offer banking services, and
privatization of the banking system begins. At the same time, universal banking laws are
passed, so that banks, securities firms and insurance companies may form part of the
same financial services group.
Short sales in the stock market are authorized in September.
In October, the investment regime for open trust funds is liberalized, scrapping
requirements for government securities holdings as a proportion of total assets.
The issue of commercial paper indexed to the dollar, as well as foreign investment in all
government paper, is authorized in December.
Private sector is again authorized to provide banking and credit services.
Financial groups can be formed among all types of financial intermediaries in the system.
1991
Regulation of commissions charged by securities dealers for stock market operations is
abolished in June.
The 30 percent liquidity requirement on bank liabilities is removed. Foreign exchange
controls, in force since 1982, are removed in November.
1992 General rules for the organization and operation of savings and loan companies are41
passed. 15% of their portfolio must be invested on government securities or banking
instruments and the rest can be invested to acquire other assets denominated in national
currency.
The legal and conceptual framework to carry out the pension fund reform is set out.
Individual worker accounts are set at the Social Security Institute to eventually be
traspassed to investment societies. Pension funds must be invested in Federal
Government securities and generate at least a 2 percent real interest rate, net of
management fees.
1994
Mexico assumes the obligation to allow Canadian and US financial intermediaries to
operate in the -National Territory (up to specified market and firm level limits) as part of
NAFTA.
Bond securities firms, warehouses, savings and loans companies, foreign exchange
houses, stock specialists and investment societies and controllers are to be allowed in
immediately.
Banking institutions, brokerage houses, insurance companies, financial societies of limited
objectives, financial factoring firms and leasing companies are to be allowed in gradually
and progressively in a 6 years period, counted from January 1, 1994 to December 31,
1999.
The authorization to establish a market to trade future contracts based on nominal interest
rates ant the INPC is granted.
A mayor reform of the payment system starts. It pursues 5 objectives:
1)  Create a high value electronic payment system at the retail level.
2)  Stimulate the use of electronic payment system at the retail level.
3)  Establish overdrafting limits to the commercial banks’ accounts at Banco de
Mexico.
4)  Adjust compensation rules applied to payment documents denominated in nominal
currency.
5)  Adopt “delivery against payment” practices in operations with government
securities.
6)  Modify the domestic system for paying documents denominated in dollars.
1996 Rules for the operation of pension fund administration and investment societies are
published.
2000 Rules for the operations of “government securities market specialists are set .  The first
group of these specialists started to operate on September 2000.
Source:  Babatz (1997) and Yearly Report of Banco de México, various numbers.42
Appendix 2
Table A2.1  Correlation Matrix of Alternative Measures of the Auction Price
Differential, May 2000-April 2001
PV-PP:  Banxico’s Vector Secondary Market Price-Primary Auction Price
PF-PP:  Funding Rate Secondary Market Price-Primary Auction Price
PIEP-PP:  IEP Secondary Market Price- Primary Auction Price
Table A2.2  Basic Statistics of Alternative Measures of the Auction Price
Differential, May 2000-April 2001
CETES 28 CETES 91
PV-PP 1.00 0.21 0.07 1.00 0.35 0.87
PF-PP 0.21 1.00 0.23 0.35 1.00 0.14
PIEP-PP 0.07 0.23 1.00 0.87 0.14 1.00
CETES 182 CETES 364
PV-PP 1.00 -0.01 0.95 1.00 0.05 0.96
PF-PP -0.01 1.00 -0.16 0.05 1.00 -0.16
PIEP-PP 0.95 -0.16 1.00 0.96 -0.16 1.00
CETEs 28 CETEs 91
Pvector-Pprim Pfondeo-Pprim Piep-Pprim Pvector-Pprim Pfondeo-Pprim Piep-Pprim
Promedio 0.011 0.007 0.023 0.208 0.311 0.190
Desv. Est. 0.021 0.030 0.020 0.076 0.135 0.083
Máximo 0.051 0.052 0.062 0.478 0.647 0.494
Mínimo -0.036 -0.065 -0.032 0.003 -0.007 -0.038
CETEs 182 CETEs 364
Pvector-Pprim Pfondeo-Pprim Piep-Pprim Pvector-Pprim Pfondeo-Pprim Piep-Pprim
Promedio 0.699 0.897 0.643 2.439 2.787 2.381
Desv. Est. 0.144 0.365 0.432 0.311 0.863 0.314
Máximo 1.027 1.603 1.337 2.983 4.030 2.952
Mínimo 0.406 0.214 -0.238 2.010 1.335 1.89543
Table A2.3  Price Differentials of Auctions With and Without Reopening
With Reopening Without Reopening








Average 0.288 0.140 0.349 0.318
Std. Dev. 0.120 0.055 1.282 0.893
Max 1.350 0.855 10.530 10.359
All CETES
Min -0.302 -0.393 -13.794 -14.730
Average 0.093 0.087 0.098 0.089 0.032 0.031
Std. Dev. 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.036 0.040
Max 0.350 0.257 0.350 0.247 0.965 0.559
CETES 28
Min -0.212 -0.152 -0.155 -0.151 -2.403 -2.595
Average 0.657 0.427 0.480 0.192 0.356 0.290
Std. Dev. 0.181 0.045 0.136 0.103 0.355 0.126
Max 1.558 0.855 1.350 0.855 3.044 2.088
CETES  91
Min -0.302 -0.130 -0.302 -0.393 -2.269 -0.445
Average 1.798 0.565 2.047 1.467 0.512 0.565
Std. Dev. 0.986 2.455 0.971 0.222 2.266 2.455
Max 3.700 2.354 5.016 2.354 5.016 2.354
CETES 182
Min 0.061 -14.730 0.522 0.128 -13.794 -14.730
Average 2.519 1.448 2.519 1.359 1.062 1.448
Std. Dev. 4.268 4.422 4.429 3.772 5.690 4.422
Max 9.801 10.359 10.530 10.359 10.530 10.359
CETES 365
Min -1.914 -1.585 -1.682 -1.798 -7.644 -1.58544
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DIFFR 1.00 0.63 -0.03 0.41 0.09 0.24 0.50 0.05 0.22 0.43 0.06 0.46
DIFIEP 0.63 1.00 0.07 0.48 0.12 -0.08 0.68 -0.24 -0.21 0.65 0.17 0.45
COVER -0.03 0.07 1.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.09 -0.21 -0.21 0.10 0.93 -0.11
BIDDERS 0.41 0.48 -0.03 1.00 0.04 -0.03 0.55 -0.07 -0.03 0.55 0.06 0.38
RBIDASIG 0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.04 1.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.09
VARFR 0.24 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 0.02 0.42 0.47 -0.04 -0.05 0.17
ISSUESIZE 0.50 0.68 0.09 0.55 0.09 0.02 1.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.99 0.25 0.75
1/PFR 0.05 -0.24 -0.21 -0.07 -0.07 0.42 -0.04 1.00 0.98 -0.08 -0.18 0.36
1/PIEP 0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.03 -0.07 0.47 -0.02 0.98 1.00 -0.06 -0.19 0.38
OUTINSEC 0.43 0.65 0.10 0.55 0.09 -0.04 0.99 -0.08 -0.06 1.00 0.26 0.71
AVGBID 0.06 0.17 0.93 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.25 -0.18 -0.19 0.26 1.00 0.04
PCETES 0.46 0.45 -0.11 0.38 0.09 0.17 0.75 0.36 0.38 0.71 0.04 1.00
91 DAYS CETES
DIFFR 1.00 0.27 -0.33 0.30 0.41 0.30 0.11 0.11 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.06
DIFIEP 0.27 1.00 0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.14 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.28
COVER -0.33 0.12 1.00 -0.42 -0.21 -0.07 -0.15 0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.14 -0.11
BIDDERS 0.30 0.04 -0.42 1.00 0.19 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.02
RBIDASIG 0.41 0.07 -0.21 0.19 1.00 0.20 0.01 0.32 0.43 -0.03 -0.02 0.12
VARFR 0.30 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.20 1.00 -0.07 0.34 0.42 -0.04 -0.07 0.03
ISSUESIZE 0.11 -0.10 -0.15 0.07 0.01 -0.07 1.00 -0.24 -0.17 0.96 0.62 0.75
1/PFR 0.11 0.14 0.07 -0.03 0.32 0.34 -0.24 1.00 0.93 -0.18 -0.43 0.10
1/PIEP 0.39 0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.43 0.42 -0.17 0.93 1.00 -0.13 -0.40 0.17
OUTINSEC 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.96 -0.18 -0.13 1.00 0.58 0.71
AVGBID 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.62 -0.43 -0.40 0.58 1.00 0.40
PCETES 0.06 -0.28 -0.11 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.75 0.10 0.17 0.71 0.40 1.00
182 DAYS CETES
DIFFR 1.00 0.36 -0.02 0.12 0.00 -0.20 0.24 -0.51 -0.21 0.27 0.06 0.31
DIFIEP 0.36 1.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.35 -0.13 -0.11 -0.25 -0.25 -0.07 -0.26
COVER -0.02 -0.04 1.00 -0.11 0.41 -0.07 -0.13 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.84 0.03
BIDDERS 0.12 -0.10 -0.11 1.00 0.08 -0.16 0.48 -0.36 -0.30 0.29 0.06 0.34
RBIDASIG 0.00 -0.04 0.41 0.08 1.00 0.09 -0.13 0.25 0.36 -0.05 0.32 -0.22
VARFR -0.20 -0.35 -0.07 -0.16 0.09 1.00 -0.12 0.42 0.55 0.05 -0.07 -0.16
ISSUESIZE 0.24 -0.13 -0.13 0.48 -0.13 -0.12 1.00 -0.59 -0.34 0.58 0.27 0.42
1/PFR -0.51 -0.11 0.05 -0.36 0.25 0.42 -0.59 1.00 0.80 -0.30 -0.24 -0.31
1/PIEP -0.21 -0.25 -0.03 -0.30 0.36 0.55 -0.34 0.80 1.00 -0.03 -0.19 -0.36
OUTINSEC 0.27 -0.25 -0.06 0.29 -0.05 0.05 0.58 -0.30 -0.03 1.00 0.23 0.52
AVGBID 0.06 -0.07 0.84 0.06 0.32 -0.07 0.27 -0.24 -0.19 0.23 1.00 0.09
PCETES 0.31 -0.26 0.03 0.34 -0.22 -0.16 0.42 -0.31 -0.36 0.52 0.09 1.00
365 DAYS CETES
DIFFR 1.00 0.49 0.20 -0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.10 -0.37 -0.10 0.02 -0.39 0.50
DIFIEP 0.49 1.00 0.21 -0.26 -0.01 0.02 -0.20 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.46 0.34
COVER 0.20 0.21 1.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04 -0.20 0.04
BIDDERS -0.11 -0.26 -0.13 1.00 0.27 -0.01 0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.19
RBIDASIG -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.27 1.00 0.09 -0.07 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.02 -0.17
VARFR -0.10 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.09 1.00 -0.17 0.59 0.60 0.39 0.20 -0.25
ISSUESIZE 0.10 -0.20 -0.06 0.12 -0.07 -0.17 1.00 -0.48 -0.38 0.16 0.33 0.66
1/PFR -0.37 0.10 -0.13 -0.06 0.10 0.59 -0.48 1.00 0.87 0.33 0.10 -0.53
1/PIEP -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 0.00 0.12 0.60 -0.38 0.87 1.00 0.44 0.11 -0.48
OUTINSEC 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.39 0.16 0.33 0.44 1.00 0.35 -0.13
AVGBID -0.39 -0.46 -0.20 0.06 0.02 0.20 0.33 0.10 0.11 0.35 1.00 -0.20
PCETES 0.50 0.34 0.04 -0.19 -0.17 -0.25 0.66 -0.53 -0.48 -0.13 -0.20 1.0045





























































































n 0.09 0.06 0.00 9.32 0.01 0.63 17.32 10.17 10.17 8.54 0.13 0.29
Maximum 0.98 0.56 0.04 49.00 1.43 7.50 36.00 10.33 10.28 16.80 1.75 0.67
Minimum -0.18 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 10.10 10.10 0.80 0.01 0.12
Std. Dev. 0.13 0.08 0.00 5.85 0.10 1.10 10.14 0.05 0.04 5.06 0.12 0.12
91 DAYS CETES
Mean 0.72 0.38 0.00 10.09 0.00 0.63 22.87 10.58 10.54 31.16 0.10 0.37
Maximum 3.33 2.09 0.01 41.00 0.00 7.50 41.00 11.07 10.92 60.30 0.23 0.58
Minimum -0.36 -1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 10.12 10.13 1.60 0.05 0.27
Std. Dev. 0.56 0.38 0.00 5.23 0.00 1.10 11.89 0.15 0.14 17.69 0.04 0.11
182 DAYS CETEs
Mean 2.09 1.34 0.00 9.11 0.00 0.71 14.21 11.19 11.04 24.71 0.09 0.25
Maximum 5.22 3.61 0.06 27.00 0.00 7.50 41.00 12.09 11.68 57.40 0.68 0.53
Minimum -0.39 -0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 10.39 10.41 0.50 0.04 0.05
Std. Dev. 1.05 0.68 0.01 4.35 0.00 1.21 7.29 0.24 0.23 12.27 0.07 0.08
365 DAYS CETES
Mean 5.51 3.88 0.00 9.43 0.00 0.72 10.96 13.04 12.07 31.08 0.14 0.19
Maximum 13.20 10.83 0.03 56.00 0.00 7.50 50.00 15.55 13.37 51.40 1.61 0.33
Minimum 0.64 -1.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 10.93 10.65 1.20 0.03 0.03
Std. Dev. 2.54 2.33 0.00 5.56 0.00 1.22 8.21 0.71 0.44 11.25 0.19 0.06
ALL CETES
Mean 1.88 1.26 0.00 9.55 0.00 0.67 16.75 11.13 10.88 22.61 0.11 0.28
Maximum 13.20 10.83 0.06 56.00 1.43 7.50 50.00 15.55 13.37 60.30 1.75 0.67
Minimum -0.39 -1.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 10.10 10.10 0.50 0.01 0.03
Std. Dev. 2.42 1.85 0.00 5.30 0.05 1.15 10.63 1.12 0.74 15.89 0.12 0.1146



































































Mean 0.04 3.17 2.55 1.27 10.19 6.18 0.29 0.79 0.36 0.00
Maximum 0.97 43.90 96.53 3.60 10.65 16.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Minimum -0.83 0.38 0.00 0.28 10.07 0.80 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 0.16 2.45 9.91 0.90 0.10 4.47 0.12 0.41 0.48 0.00
91 DAYS CETES
Mean 0.36 3.59 2.05 1.57 10.61 21.09 0.32 0.78 0.34 0.00
Maximum 3.04 9.60 81.14 4.10 12.17 60.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Minimum -2.27 0.00 0.00 0.25 10.12 3.76 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 0.63 1.50 7.10 1.19 0.33 16.62 0.10 0.41 0.47 0.00
182 DAYS CETES
Mean 0.74 3.88 2.17 1.09 11.16 22.32 0.29 0.78 0.35 0.13
Maximum 5.02 9.84 149.44 3.00 13.29 50.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum -4.88 0.00 0.00 0.28 10.42 0.50 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 1.32 1.43 11.33 0.64 0.53 10.75 0.09 0.41 0.48 0.33
364 DAYS CETES
Mean 2.00 3.71 2.22 0.88 12.24 32.18 0.22 0.78 0.14 0.53
Maximum 10.24 8.53 149.44 5.00 16.57 70.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum -7.81 0.00 0.00 0.10 10.85 1.50 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 2.65 1.34 12.28 0.70 0.87 12.48 0.08 0.41 0.35 0.50
ALL CETES
Mean 0.67 3.56 2.26 1.23 10.93 19.16 0.28 0.78 0.31 0.13
Maximum 10.24 43.90 149.44 5.00 16.57 70.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum -7.81 0.00 0.00 0.10 10.07 0.50 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 1.54 1.81 10.08 0.94 0.88 15.05 0.11 0.41 0.46 0.3447
Table A3.4  Umlauf (1993) estimations with CETES 1996-2000 data set
28 DAYS CETES 91 DAYS CETES 182 DAYS CETES 365 DAYS CETES
DIFFR DIFIEP DIFFR DIFIEP DIFFR DIFIEP DIFFR DIFIEP

















* 0.443 -0.098 0.194 0.234
















2 0.550 0.508 0.486 0.086 0.579 0.309 0.809 0.794
Obs 200 200 200 200 158 156 153 153
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




















* 0.584 0.698 0.724
***
VARFR 0.032 0.001 0.148









2 0.331 0.489 0.311 0.085 0.079 0.196 0.114 0.309
Obs 200 200 200 200 158 157 153 153
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000














* 0.543 0.410 0.296
VARFR 0.031 0.001 0.139









2 0.303 0.477 0.278 0.088 0.084 0.199 0.095 0.249
Obs 200 200 200 200 158 157 153 153
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00048





















RBIDASIG 0.004 0.357 0.663 0.032



























2 0.618 0.627 0.517 0.749
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 196 189 133 104









C -0.684 -6.381 -42.945 14.029
***
COVER 51.738
*** -0.060 -0.723 -0.080
BIDDERS 0.002 0.003 -0.018 0.023
RBIDASIG 0.052
* 0.159 1.725 0.056
VARFR -0.002 -0.007 -0.318 -0.037
DHIGHVOL -0.017 0.488 -1.214 0.698
ISSUESIZE 0.001
* -0.001 -0.173 -0.020
PCETES 0.108 -2.066
* 10.106 -7.163
1/PIEP 0.054 0.702 3.936 -0.657
OUTINSEC -0.024
** 0.015 -0.069 -0.007
AVGBID -1.243





2 0.036 0.304 -4.594 0.753
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.811 0.000
Observations 196 189 131 104
Instrument list: c, cover(-1), bidders, rbidasig, varfr, issuesize, 1/pfr, outinsec, avgbid